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Introduction
An important function of legal theory is to provide a framework
for understanding the common law and its regulatory substitutes.
Now that horizontal slickwater fracturing has renewed popular and
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academic interest in the governance of subsurface resource pools, it is
helpful to apply property theory to understand the law’s response to
issues concerning resources that lie under, or can be extracted only by
going under, more than one piece of property. If property theory is to
be helpful, it ought to sharpen our ability to correctly diagnose the
social problems addressed by the law and to identify the coherence of,
and justification for, the law’s response to those problems.
By this measure, property theory has underserved our understanding
of both the problem of subsurface resource pools and the law’s
response to that problem. Property theory was ill-equipped to address
the problem of subsurface resource pools because it had only two
paradigms for identifying and addressing the problem: a paradigm of
private property and a paradigm of commons property. Because neither
paradigm adequately addresses the problem of subsurface resource
pools, the law applicable to water, oil, and gas has been misunderstood
and mischaracterized.
In this Article, we argue that property theory, appropriately
understood, shows that subsurface water, oil, and gas ought to be
treated as shared property that can be exploited, if it is to be exploited
at all, by the coordinating agreements of owners of the surface property,
or their licensees, supervised by common law courts. We therefore offer
the paradigm of shared property as the appropriate analysis for
thinking about the law’s approach to rights in oil and natural gas. We
also argue that the shared property paradigm is largely consistent with
the common law’s approach to subsurface resource pools, even though
conventional understanding of the law vacillates between the private
property and commons property paradigms.
Much of this Article is revisionist. We argue, unconventionally,
that the common law embraced the paradigm of shared property in
much of its regulation of subsurface resource pools because it
essentially treated those resources as owned by tenants in common, as
modified by the common law nuisance exception for injuries to
subsurface resource pools. Under this reading, the special common law
rules regarding subsurface resource pools have been misunderstood either
as providing for (1) commons property treatment of subsurface resource
pools underground followed by private property treatment after the
resources are extracted from the subsurface pools or (2) private property
treatment of the resources even while underground but subject to loss
of title if the resources crossed property boundaries. Under our reading
of the cases, when interpreted against the paradigm of shared property,
the common law consistently recognized shared ownership of subsurface
resource pools yet limited surface owner’s rights to quiet enjoyment of
subsurface resource pools based solely on courts’ own perceived
incapacity, because the resources are hidden, to understand the causal
relationship between land use and disruption of enjoyment of subsurface
resource pools. But this limit did not prevent courts from coordinating
the exploitation of subsurface resource pools between surface owners by
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recognizing causes of action for malicious interference, waste, and
unreasonable exploitation.
This analysis supports our claim that the property issues inherent
in today’s concerns over horizontal slickwater fracturing can be
addressed under private agreements that are subject to judicial
supervision.1 Moreover, because we now have the seismic technology
to understand resource location and flows, the common law’s reluctance
to provide common owners of shared property with an accounting
should dissipate.
Part I examines in detail the common law of subsurface resource
pools. Part II demonstrates this common law of subsurface resource
pools is an application of the shared property paradigm. Part III
suggests that judicially supervised private governance regimes can
ensure that subsurface resource pools are exploited efficiently and fairly.

I.

Correcting the Conventional Views of the
Law of Subsurface Resource Pools

Analytically, subsurface resource pools of oil, gas, and water pose
distinctive problems for courts because of two distinguishing
characteristics. First, subsurface resource pools are not visible from
the surface. Second, these resources are fluids that are susceptible to
movement across property lines or that (as in the case of horizontal
slickwater fracturing) can be extracted only by activities that are not
confined within property boundaries. The common law courts
responded to these characteristics in two opposing ways. On the one
hand, emphasizing the hidden nature of the resource, common law
courts have consistently held that interference with a surface owner’s
enjoyment of the resource is generally not actionable. On the other
hand, common law courts responded to the migratory character of
subsurface resources by recognizing actions for malicious interference,
waste, and unreasonable exploitation. The hidden character limited
the law’s protections for the quiet enjoyment of subsurface resource
pools, whereas the migratory character gave rise to causes of action
that coordinated uses between owners.
These two characteristics gave rise, in other words, to legal
approaches that varied with the question courts were considering.
These variations, in turn, made it difficult for theorists to pin down a
1.

Oil and gas recovered from shale deposits is different from other pooled
resources in that it does not migrate as easily from one location to
another. Nonetheless, we can apply the property regimes developed for
common pool resources to the property regimes applied to hydraulic
fracturing because of their similarities. The law applicable to oil and gas
has always taken its migratory nature into account; gas recovered from
shale migrates less but can be effectively recovered only by horizontal
drilling that crosses surface boundaries. The oil and gas do not migrate
but the method of extraction, in a sense, does.
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theory of subsurface resources that adequately described the range of
decisions that courts were making. Moreover, theorists were limited in
the paradigms around which they could organize their interpretation
of legal doctrine. In Part I.A, we summarize the conventional
theoretical approaches and explain their inadequacy.
A.

Conventional Views of the Law of Subsurface Resource Pools:
Ferae Naturae, Ad Coelum, and “Drill, Baby, Drill!”

Uncounted first-year property students encounter the following in
a leading property casebook:
Oil and natural gas commonly collect in reservoirs that underlie
many acres of land owned by many different people. The
resources have a fugitive character in that they wander from
place to place. Oil or gas once under the land of A might
migrate to space under the land of B as the result of natural
circumstances or because B drops a well and mines a common
pool beneath A’s and B’s land. . . .
When these obviously problematic situations first led to
litigation—usually (but not always) a suit by someone like A to
recover the value of gas or oil drawn away by someone like B—
the courts were induced by the fugitive nature of the resources
in question to liken them to wild animals. And because
ownership of wild animals had long been settled in terms of the
rule of capture, the courts reasoned that ownership of oil and
gas should be determined in the same manner.2

This characterization reflects one of three conventional conceptions of
the common law of subsurface resource pools—namely that because
resources in subsurface pools are migratory, like wild animals, they
are unowned until captured, and once captured, title vests in the
captor.3 Under this ferae naturae4 view, water, oil, and gas are
commons property while they remain underground.
2.

Dukeminier et al., Property 36 (7th ed. 2010) (footnote omitted).

3.

Robert E. Hardwicke, The Rule of Capture and Its Implications as
Applied to Oil and Gas, 13 Tex. L. Rev. 391, 393 (1935) (“The owner
of a tract of land acquires title to the oil or gas which he produces from
wells drilled thereon, though it may be proved that part of such oil or
gas migrated from adjoining lands. The antithesis of the rule of capture
is: The owner of a tract of land owns the oil and gas in place and,
should such minerals migrate to a neighbor’s land and be produced from
wells thereon, title would not vest in the neighbor, but, to the contrary,
the migrating oil or gas, or at least an amount equal to that which
migrated, could be recovered by the true owner.”); see also Laura H.
Burney, A Pragmatic Approach to Decision Making in the Next Era of
Oil and Gas Jurisprudence, 16 J. Energy Nat. Resources & Envtl.
L. 1, 9 (1996) (“By analogizing to the common-law rule used to
determine rights in wild animals (ferae naturae), courts adopted the rule
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The Restatement (Second) of Torts offers another conventional
conception of the common law of subsurface resource pools:
The “English rule” relating to the use of ground water was
adopted in a number of American states. It gave each landowner
complete freedom to withdraw and use ground water and made
no attempt to apportion the supply among possessors off
overlying land . . . . It was based on the premise that groundwater
is the absolute property of the owner of the freehold, like the
rocks, soil and minerals that compose it, so that he is free to
withdraw it at will and do with it as he pleases regardless of the
effect upon his neighbors. . . . Although framed in property
language, the rule was in reality a rule of capture, for a
landowner’s pump could induce water under the land of his
neighbor to flow to his well—water that was in theory the
neighbor’s property while it remained in place.5

Under this view, because the surface owner owns the land, it logically
follows that the surface owner must absolutely own the subsurface
resource pools contained within it and be privileged to “do with it as
he pleases.”6 Under this ad coelum view, water, oil, and gas are owned
by the owner of the surface under which they lie, but ownership is
transferred as water, oil, and gas cross the property line from one
surface owner to another.7 Further, it follows from the absolute nature
of capture to define a property owner’s rights in oil and gas beneath her
property. Under the rule of capture, an owner of land ‘acquires title to
the oil or gas which he produces from wells drilled thereon.’” (quoting
Hardwicke, supra note 3, at 393)); Jonathan H. Adler, Conservation
Through Collusion: Antitrust as an Obstacle to Marine Resource
Conservation, 61 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 3, 50 (2004) (“Under the rule
of capture, landowners acquire property rights to oil upon extraction.”).
4.

This translates to “of a wild nature.” Black’s Law Dictionary 696
(9th ed. 2009).

5.

Restatement (Second) of Torts, ch. 41, topic 4, intro. note (1979);
see also Dukeminier et al., supra note 2, at 37–38 (“Groundwater
(water found in underground aquifers) . . . was governed early on by the
English rule of absolute ownership, which allowed each landowner over
an aquifer to withdraw freely without regard to effects on neighbors.”).

6.

Restatement (Second) of Torts, ch. 41, topic 4, introductory note,
at 256 (1977).

7.

The ad coelum phrase comes from the Latin expression cujus est solum,
ejus est usque ad coelum et infera—“whoever owns the soil, it is theirs
all the way up to Heaven and down to Hell.” The phrase was coined by
a medieval, not ancient, Italian, Accursius. See Clement L. Bouvé,
Private Ownership of Airspace, 1 Air L. Rev. 232, 246 (1930)
(providing a general discussion of the Latin phrase, its origin, and its
place in Roman Law). It was popularized by Blackstone five centuries
later. See 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *18. This concept
has not been especially helpful and courts have spent a good deal of
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of the ownership of the resources while they are beneath the surface
owner’s property that the surface owner is privileged to extract it and
thereby cause additional water, oil, or gas to migrate across the
boundary and become his property.
Still a third conventional view comes from one historically prominent
commentator, Walter Summers, who is agnostic as to the ownership of
resources in subsurface pools—subscribing neither to the ferae naturae
view nor the ad coelum view—but adamant that extraction is
privileged and immune from claims of unlawful drainage because
otherwise the resources could not be exploited.8 For Summers, any
surface owner could protect her interests by drilling faster than her
neighbors. This rather pragmatic view is not easily denominated by a
venerable Latin phrase, but is best summed up by the more recent
political jingoism, “Drill, baby, drill!”
These conventional theories about the grounds on which courts
were regulating subsurface resource pools dramatically reflect a near
myopic focus on one feature of the legal regime—the ability of one
surface owner to legally drain oil and gas from beneath a neighbor’s
property. This feature of the law entered popular culture with the
2007 film There Will Be Blood, in which Daniel Plainview shouted at
his rival in the climactic final scene:

time and energy in attempts to get out from under its burdensome logic.
See, e.g., Hinman v. Pac. Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755, 758 (9th Cir. 1936)
(rejecting a literal interpretation of the ad coelom doctrine and holding
that landowners only own “the space above the ground” the owner “can
occupy or make use of” as “[a]ll that lies beyond belongs to the world”).
8.

Walter L. Summers, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas § 24,
at 71–72 (1927) (“Suppose A is the owner in fee of a tract of land,
Blackacre, . . . and that B is a like owner of a nearby or adjoining tract of
land, Whiteacre, and that beneath these there is an oil and gas
reservoir . . . . Suppose, further, that A drills a well upon Blackacre,
tapping the oil or gas reservoir at such a point that by the natural
pressure existing in the reservoir oil or gas come from under B’s land,
Whiteacre, into A’s well on Blackacre, and are so reduced to actual
possession by A; have B’s legal rights in respect to the oil or gas in situ
under Whiteacre been violated? Or, to put it another way, was A legally
privileged to take the oil and gas from under Whiteacre in the manner
described? The courts are of the unanimous opinion that A’s acts of
taking oil or gas in the manner described from under both tracts of land
are legally privileged, and that B has no rights that A so take the oil and
gas from Whiteacre by acts lawfully done upon Blackacre as above
described.”); W.L. Summers, Legal Rights Against Drainage of Oil and
Gas, 18 Texas L. Rev. 27, 29 (1939) (“[Courts] knew that one landowner
could not produce from his land without taking some of the oil and gas
from adjacent lands, but they were likewise aware of the fact that the
economic value of oil and gas could not be realized without production;
consequently, they ruled in favor of unlimited privileges of taking.”).
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Drainage! Drainage, Eli, you boy. Drained dry. I’m so sorry.
Here, if you have a milkshake, and I have a milkshake, and I
have a straw. There it is, that’s a straw, you see? You
watching? And my straw reaches across the room, and starts to
drink your milkshake. I drink your milkshake! I drink it up!9

9.

There Will Be Blood (Paramount Vantage and Miramax Films
2007). In the scene, Plainview is explaining that he has already extracted
the oil beneath a certain property despite never drilling on its surface.
Director Paul Thomas Anderson, who received an Academy Award
nomination for the screenplay, told several media outlets that the film’s
iconic “I drink your milkshake” lines “came straight from a transcript
[Anderson] found of the 1924 congressional hearings over the Teapot
Dome scandal.” Scott Bowles, ‘Blood’ Fans Drink Up Milkshake
Catchphrase, USA Today (Feb. 4, 2008), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
life/movies/news/2008-02-03-blood-milkshake_N.htm (“In explaining oil
drainage, [former Secretary of the Interior Albert] Fall’s ‘way of
describing it was to say “Sir, if you have a milkshake and I have a
milkshake and my straw reaches across the room, I’ll end up drinking
your milkshake,” ’ Anderson says. ‘I just took this insane concept and
used it.’ ”); see also Scott Foundas, Paul Thomas Anderson: Blood,
Sweat and Tears, L.A. Wkly. (Feb. 4, 2008), http://www.laweekly.com/
2008-01-17/film-tv/blood-sweat-and-tears (“I’m sure I embellished it and
changed it around and made it more Plainview. But Fall used the word
‘milk shake,’ and I thought it was so great.”). Many film-related
websites and blogs reproduced Anderson’s anecdote about the origin of
the lines.
But searches of the transcripts of the relevant Teapot Dome
investigation hearings produced no testimony or other record similar to
what Anderson described. Leases upon Navy Oil Reserves: Hearing on
S. Res. 147, 282, 294, and 434, Before the S. Comm. on Public Lands
and Surveys, 67th–68th Cong. (1923–1924). No form of the word “milk
shake” was found in the transcripts, and the few mentions of other
words central to the quoted lines, like “straw” and “drink,” appear only
in unrelated contexts. However, the Congressional Record does contain a
discussion of subsurface resource extraction—from eighty years later—
with specific imagery very similar to the film’s. In 2003, Senator Peter
Domenici remarked on the Senate floor during a debate over drilling in
the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge:
And you see, way far away, the oil is underground, and it is
going to be drilled and come up . . . . Here is a giant reservoir
underground. . . . [J]ust like a curved straw, you put it
underground and maneuver it, and the “milk shake” is way over
there, and your little child wants the milk shake, and they sit
over here in their bedroom where they are feeling ill, and they
just gobble it up from way down in the kitchen, where you don't
even have to move the Mix Master that made the ice cream for
them. You don't have to take it up to the bedroom. This
describes the actual drilling that is taking place.
149 Cong. Rec. 6729 (2003). Coincidentally, both Fall (1912–1921) and
Domenici (1973–2009) represented New Mexico in the Senate.
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Although the conventional views explain drainage rights in
reassuringly simple ways, they do not reflect what courts have said or
done over the last century. Instead, they reflect the failure of property
theory to develop the appropriate paradigm for addressing the social
issues raised by subsurface resource pools. In particular, they reflect
an attempt to shoehorn our understanding of judicial treatment of
subsurface resource pools into the familiar commons property and
private property paradigms. In actuality, courts were applying a shared
property paradigm, one adjusted to account for the fact that subsurface
resources are hidden from view.
In our revisionist description of the common law, we show that
when faced with questions about the disruption of subsurface resource
pools, courts were not concerned about title but about the hidden
nature of the resources and the resulting inability of courts to
determine which oil and gas was underneath which surface property.
Instead of focusing on the capture of wild animals, courts held that
injuries to subsurface oil and gas are damnum absque injuria by
analogy to earlier cases dealing with subsurface water. Moreover,
although courts could not offer a remedy for diminution of subsurface
resource pools because the resources were hidden, the migratory
nature of the resources induced courts to develop several doctrines
that required each surface owner to take into account the interests of
other surface owners when deciding how to exploit the subsurface
common pool resource: causes of action for malicious interference,
waste, and unreasonable exploitation. Far from following the
conventional ferae naturae view, the ad coelum view, or a “Dril,
Baby, Drill!” view, the common law recognized, on the one hand,
limits on the judicial ability to regulate hidden resources (the subject
of Part I.B) while, on the other hand, recognizing the responsibilities
that arose from shared migratory ownership of subsurface resource
pools (the subject of Part I.C).
B. Response to the Hidden Nature of Subsurface Resource Pools:
Disrupting Subsurface Resource Pools is Damnum Absque Injuria

When common law courts were called on to resolve disputes
arising from one owner’s complaints about neighboring activities that
interfered with the owner’s enjoyment of subsurface water, oil, or gas,
they refused to provide a remedy. The activities complained of were
quite varied, but courts invariably held that interferences with
subsurface water, oil, and gas were damnum absque injuria because of
the hidden character of these resources.
The term damnum absque injuria, damage without injury, denotes
a conclusion without revealing the reason for the conclusion, for the
distinction between “damage with injury” and “damage without injury”
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is unexplained.10 This is because damnum absque injuria simply
announces a common law result—it conveys neither a justification for,
nor a description of, a particular kind of injury.11 It is of considerable
vintage, going back at least as far as Hamlyn v. More, the 1410 case
exempting fair competition from nuisance liability.12 It means that a
10.

Chief Justice Marshall invoked the damnum absque injuria framework in
the second inquiry in Marbury v. Madison:
It behooves us then to enquire whether there be in its composition
any ingredient which shall exempt it from legal investigation, or
exclude the injured party from legal redress. In pursuing this
enquiry the first question which presents itself, is, whether this
can be arranged with the class of cases which come under the
description of damnum absque injuria—a loss without an injury.
This description of cases never has been considered, and it is
believed never can be considered, as comprehending offices of
trust, of honor or of profit. The office of justice of peace in the
district of Columbia is such an office; it is therefore worthy of
the attention and guardianship of the laws. It has received that
attention and guardianship. . . . It is not then on account of the
worthlessness of the thing pursued, that the injured party can be
alleged to be without remedy.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163–64 (1803). As in other
cases, Marbury provides no meaningful distinction between, in the
language of Marshall, loss without injury and loss with injury. It is, as
always, a maxim denoting a result but not a justification for the result.

11.

The damnum absque injuria cases are similar to judicial cognizability
requirements for causes of action brought in federal court in origin as well
as substance. The common law nuisance cause of action and its exceptions
under the damnum absque injuria framework originated in the English
crown courts. The crown courts in that time exercised jurisdiction alongside
seigniorial courts, as the federal courts exercise jurisdiction alongside state
courts. This dual judicial structure breeds wholesale rejections of entire
classes of causes of action as the superior judicial body shapes and
optimizes its jurisdiction. Seigniorial courts were unwilling to limit
jurisdiction or reject classes of actions as this would restrict a lord’s power
without any benefit to the lord. In any given case, the seigniorial court
could just rule against a particular plaintiff without limiting the power to
decide a similar dispute in the future. When American states imported the
common law of the English crown courts, they imported the practice of
jurisdictional optimization as well and it continued unabated, perhaps
because it had by that time proved so beneficial to the growth and
development of the English legal system.

12.

Hamlyn v. More, Y.B. 11 Hen. 4, fol. 47, Hil., pl. 21 (1410) (Eng.);
John Baker, Baker and Milsom: Sources of English Legal
History 671–73 (Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2010) (1986) [hereinafter
Baker & Milsom]. Before Hamlyn v. More, proprietors of capital
projects could sue upstart competition. See Robert D. Cheren, Note,
Tragic Parlor Pigs and Comedic Rascally Rabbits: Why Common Law
Nuisance Exceptions Refute Coase’s Economic Analysis of the Law, 63
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 555, 572 (2012).
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court has determined that (1) a class of injuries never gives rise to
nuisance liability, (2) a class of activities is immune from nuisance
liability, or (3) injuries suffered at the hand of a class of causal agents
never give rise to nuisance liability. The common law limitation on
actions for interference with subsurface water, oil, and gas and the
American rule on light and air are of the first type.13 The privilege to
inflict injury through fair competition (an exception to the nuisance
concept), is of the second type.14 The English rule exempting activities
and injuries from the nuisance regime if the harm flows through wild
animals is of the third type.15 In each of these cases, common law
courts held that a nuisance action does not lie.
The common law limitation on actions for interference with
subsurface water, oil, and gas can be traced to the English case of
Acton v. Blundell.16 In Acton, the court held that a neighbor’s
interference with subsurface (as opposed to visible) water resources
was damnum absque injuria. A cotton-spinner brought an action
against an operator of a coal pit whose mining activities allegedly
interfered with the cotton-spinner’s use and application of “the water
of certain underground springs, streams, and watercourses” in the
cotton-spinner’s operation of his mill.17 The supply of water was at
first “considerably diminished” and ultimately “rendered altogether
13.

See Acton v. Blundell, (1843) 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Exch.); 12 M. & W.
324 (Eng.); Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc,
168 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1964).

14.

See Hamlyn v. More, Y.B. 11 Hen. 4, fol. 47, Hil., pl. 21 (1410) (Eng.);
Baker & Milsom, supra note 13, at 672.

15.

See Boulston v. Hardy, (1596) 77 Eng. Rep. 216 (C.P.); Bowlston v.
Hardy, (1596) 78 Eng. Rep. 794 (C.P.).

16.

Acton, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223; 12 M. & W. 324. A Massachusetts case from
1836 held an interference with subsurface water damnum absque injuria,
but with the important caveat that the plaintiff had not gained prescriptive
rights to the water by adverse use for twenty years. Greenleaf v. Francis,
35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 117, 122–23 (1836). The plaintiff’s claim is so well
and succinctly expressed by the court it is worth repeating here:
[T]he defendant dug to obtain water in his own soil, and in a
place where it was convenient for him, near to the well of the
plaintiff, and after the defendant’s well was dug, the water ceased
to flow into the plaintiff’s well, so copiously as it did before.
Id. at 122. The dissonance between Greenleaf and Acton was made
evident by an 1868 Massachusetts decision affirming a trial court’s
refusal to give a defendant the benefit of an Acton instruction and
directing verdict for a plaintiff in a case where manure stored in a
subterranean vault polluted a neighbor’s cellar and well. Ball v. Nye, 99
Mass. 582, 583–84 (1868). The defendant had requested the jury be
instructed that, if liable at all, the defendant could only be liable for the
pollution of the neighbor’s cellar, not the well. Id. at 583.

17.

Acton, 152 Eng. Rep. at 1232; 12 M. & W. at 347 (Tindal C.J.).
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insufficient for the purposes of the mill” by the coal mining.18 It was
well established at the time of Acton that
each proprietor of the land has a right to the advantage of the
stream flowing in its natural course over his land, to use the
same as he pleases, for any purposes of his own, not inconsistent
with a similar right in the proprietors of the land above or
below; so that, neither can any proprietor above diminish the
quantity or injure the quality of the water which would
otherwise naturally descend, nor can any proprietor below throw
back the water without the license or the grant of the proprietor
above.19

If this principle applied equally to “the enjoyment of underground
springs, or to a well supplied thereby” then “undoubtedly” the operator
of the coal mill “could not justify the sinking of the coal-pits” to the
detriment of the cotton-spinner.20 The court held the principle did not
equally apply and that an interference with the enjoyment of
subsurface water courses is “not to be governed by the law which
applies to” surface water courses.21 Rather, the court held such
interferences are governed by
that principle, which gives to the owner of the soil all that lies
beneath his surface; that the land immediately below is his
property, whether it is solid rock, or porous ground, or venous
earth, or part soil, part water; that the person who owns the
surface may dig therein, and apply all that is there found to his
own purposes at his free will and pleasure; and that if, in the
exercise of such right, he intercepts or drains off the water
collected from underground springs in his neighbour’s well, this
inconvenience to his neighbour falls within the description of
damnum absque injuria, which cannot become the ground of an
action.22

Although the court invoked the talisman of ad coelum in its holding,
it reached the damnum absque injuria result after considering both
18.

Id. at 1233; 12 M. & W. at 348.

19.

Id. at 1233; 12 M. & W. at 349; see also Henrici de Bracton, De
Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae f. 232b (Samuel E. Thorne ed.
& trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1977) (ca. 1245–1257); Ranulf de
Glanvill, Tractatus de Legibus et Consuetudinibus Regni
Anglie qui Glanvilla Vocatur bk. XIII, c. 36 (G.D.G. Hall ed. &
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1965) (ca. 1187–1189); Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24
F. Cas. 472, 474 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827).

20.

Acton, 152 Eng. Rep. at 1233; 12 M. & W. at 349.

21.

Id. at 1235; 12 M. & W. at 353.

22.

Id.; 12 M. & W. at 354.
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the role of custom in the common law regulation of surface water
courses and the difficulty that would arise from the common law
regulation of subsurface resources. The damnum absque injuria results
in Acton and its progeny are based on a judicial sense of incapacity in
view of the hidden character of subsurface resource pools.23
The decisional progeny of Acton are legion. The majority of cases,
like Acton, dealt with subsurface water, rather than oil or gas.24 Soon
23.

Cheren, supra note 13, at 591; see also Maricopa Cnty. Mun. Water
Conservation Dist. No. 1 v. Sw. Cotton Co., 4 P.2d 369, 383 (Ariz.
1931) (“Surface waters are plainly visible, definitely ascertainable, and
the effect of their appropriation generally easily foreseen and understood
by all. Subterranean waters are necessarily more or less uncertain as to
their very existence, speculative as to their character, and frequently
incapable of an immediate demonstration of the results of their
appropriation of such a nature that investors may safely stake their
funds and farmers their future on the success of the project.”); Roath v.
Driscoll, 20 Conn. 533, 542 (1850) (“[Surface streams] are recognized as
private property: and their use is regulated by principles of obvious
equity and necessity. Their nature is defined; their progress over the
surface seen, and known, and uniform. They are not in the secret places
of the earth, and a part of it; nor is there any secresy in the influences
which move them. As soon as they appear and pass over the surface,
they assume a distinct character, and are subject to the great law of
gravitation. The purchaser of land knows what he purchases, and what
controul he can exercise over such a stream, and what are the rights of
those above or below him. Each may use them as the common
atmosphere; but none can injuriously interrupt their progress, or render
them unfit for common use. Their laws are as fixed and public, as the
laws of freehold estates.”); Upjohn v. Bd. of Health, 9 N.W. 845, 848
(Mich. 1881) (“The movements of subsurface waters are commonly so
obscure that rights in or respecting them cannot well be preserved. They
do not often have a well-defined channel, and it is not easy in many
cases to determine in what direction their movements tend. If corrupted
at one point the effect may be confined within very narrow limits, while
at another, though no surface indications would lead one to expect it,
the taint might follow the water for miles. In some cases a new well at a
considerable distance from an old one may withdraw the water from the
other and destroy it, while in other cases, in which the same result
would seem more likely, there is no perceptible influence.”); Chatfield v.
Wilson, 28 Vt. 49, 54 (1855) (“The secret, changeable, and
uncontrollable character of underground water in its operations, is so
diverse and uncertain that we cannot well subject it to the regulations
of law, nor build upon it a system of rules, as is done in the case of
surface streams.”).

24.

Sw. Cotton, 4 P.2d at 383; Roath, 20 Conn. 533; Edwards v. Haeger, 54
N.E. 176, 177 (Ill. 1899); New Albany & Salem R.R. Co. v. Peterson, 14
Ind. 112 (1860); Hougan v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 35 Iowa 558
(1872); Nourse v. Andrews, 255 S.W. 84, 86 (Ky. 1923); Chase v.
Silverstone, 62 Me. 175, 183–84 (1873); Upjohn, 9 N.W. at 845; Ryan v.
Quinlan, 124 P. 512, 516 (Mont. 1912); Beatrice Gas Co. v. Thomas, 59
N.W. 925, 927–28 (Neb. 1894); Mosier v. Caldwell, 7 Nev. 363 (1872);
Bloodgood v. Ayers, 15 N.E. 433 (N.Y. 1888); Ellis v. Duncan, 21 Barb.
230, 235 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1855); Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294
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after Edwin Drake’s 1858 oil strike, plaintiffs brought cases dealing
with the extraction of oil and natural gas from a common pool, and
courts reached the same result.25 In case after case, courts “[f]aced
(1861); Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528, 528 (1855); Houston & T. C.
Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279 (Tex. 1904); Crescent Mining Co. v. Silver
King Mining Co., 54 P. 244 (Utah 1898); Chatfield, 28 Vt. 49; Miller v.
Black Rock Springs Imp. Co., 40 S.E. 27 (Va. 1901); Pence v. Carney,
52 S.E. 702, 706 (W. Va. 1905). Ohio reversed the broad Frazier v.
Brown interpretation of the Acton rule in 1984. See Cline v. Am.
Aggregates Corp., 474 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio 1984). Utah altered the result
in Crescent Mining Co. by statute. See Riordan v. Westwood, 203 P.2d
922, 923 (Utah 1949); Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-3 (Lexis Nexis 2012).
Several states adopted a reasonableness regime at the outset without
ever holding subsurface water injuries are generally damnum absque
injuria. Cason v. Fla. Power Co., 76 So. 535 (Fla. 1917) (noting
interferences are not actionable when they are reasonable); Bassett v.
Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569, 577 (1862) (restricting “each to a
reasonable exercise of his own right, a reasonable use of his own
property, in view of the similar rights of others” because “[t]he rights of
each land-owner being similar, and his enjoyment dependent upon the
action of the other land-owners, these rights must be valueless unless
exercised with reference to each other”); Meeker v. City of E. Orange, 74
A. 379 (N.J. 1909) (rejecting the “English rule” of property in
underground resources and adopting the “reasonable user” doctrine). As
most jurisdictions that follow Acton provide for actions against
unreasonable users of subsurface resource pools, the difference in the
Acton rejecting jurisdictions is not clear. The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals in adopting the reasonableness regime stated that it
“constitutes . . . a qualification of the early rule [rather] than an
announcement of a new rule.” Pence, 52 S.E. at 706. Accordingly, the
states that adopted the reasonableness regime at the outset, like West
Virginia, arguably in one stroke adopted the rule of Acton and then
qualified it, or perhaps adopted two rules that are not actually in
conflict with one another. See discussion infra Part II.B.
25.

People’s Gas Co. v. Tyner, 31 N.E. 59, 60 (Ind. 1892) (“So far as this
suit seeks to enjoin the appellants from exploding nitroglycerin in their
gas well, upon the ground that it will increase the flow of the gas to the
injury of the appellee, it cannot, in our opinion, be sustained.”); Kelly v.
Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 399, 401 (Ohio 1897); Gruger v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 135 P.2d 485, 488–89 (Okla. 1943) (affirming dismissal
of action seeking compensation for oil withdrawn from beneath
plaintiff’s land); Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Tex.
1948) (holding landowners may “appropriate the oil and gas that have
flowed from adjacent lands without the consent of the owner of those
lands, and without incurring liability to him for drainage”); Powers v.
Union Drilling, Inc., 461 S.E.2d 844 (W. Va. 1995) (holding drainage of
oil and gas not actionable at common law). Surprisingly, the Texas
Supreme Court had no occasion to apply Acton to oil and gas until
decades after the adoption of Texas’s statutory regime for regulating oil
and gas. 210 S.W.2d 558. The court had only observed that the rule
applied in earlier cases not dealing with disputes between neighbors.
See, e.g., Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 83 S.W.2d 935, 940 (Tex.
1935) (“The common law recognizes no well spacing regulations. At
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with the prospect of a resource [they] could not see and [industrial]
activities with widespread affects” felt themselves incapable of
resolving the disputes and providing meaningful redress and accordingly
held interferences damnum absque injuria.26

common law the landowner can drill an unlimited number of wells for
oil and gas upon his land. . . . The adjoining landowner cannot complain
if wells are drilled near his boundary line. Under this rule the only way
the landowner can protect himself is to drill offset wells.”); Stephens
Cnty. v. Mid-Kan. Oil & Gas Co., 254 S.W. 290, 292 (Tex. 1923)
(“Ultimate injury from the net results of drainage, where proper diligence
is used, is altogether too conjectural to form the basis for the denial of a
right of property in that which is not only plainly as much realty as any
other part of the earth’s contents, but realty of the highest value to
mankind . . . .”). Many oil and gas producing states have no cases
applying Acton to oil and gas, probably due to the enactment of
regulatory regimes before state supreme courts had occasion to address
the issue in a purely common law fashion. This includes Idaho,
Nebraska, North Dakota, and Wyoming. As for Pennsylvania, see infra
text accompanying notes 67–71 and 90–108. As for Kentucky, see infra
text accompanying notes 41–54 and 75. As for Indiana, see infra text
accompanying notes 76–81.
26.

Cheren, supra note 13, at 593. This feeling, arising due to the hidden
character of subsurface resources, led courts not only to limit actions for
nuisance, but to adopt limiting constructions of servitudes as well. For
example, one decision narrowly interpreted a conveyance that included
right to draw water in the amount “now used” from a particular well so
as to not make actionable the subsequent construction of another well
that diminished the water in the well described in the conveyance below
the amount suggested by the words “as now used.” Davis v. Spaulding,
32 N.E. 650, 650 (Mass. 1892). The court observed:
It is impossible to know in what direction percolating water
finds its way into a well; perhaps only through the bottom of the
excavation, and perhaps through the surrounding as well as the
subjacent land. Its ways of approach, and its amount, vary with
the operation of obscure natural causes, not controllable by the
owner of the land through which it passes. If the grant of such a
well, or of the privilege of drawing water from it, were held to
impose an obligation upon all the land from which the well
might derive a supply of water, the burden would be very
indefinite, uncertain, and shifting, and would tend, without any
adequate corresponding benefit, to prevent the improvement of
land by buildings, and its use for mining, quarrying, and many
other useful purposes. . . . An intention to subject a large territory
to such a burden for the benefit of a single house lot is not to be
lightly presumed.
Id. at 652. Samuel Hamilton, one of John Steinbeck’s great heroes,
seems to know something that the court did not:
He dismounted, handed his reins to Adam, and untied his forked
wand. He took the forks in his two hands and walked slowly, his
arms out and stretched before him and the wand tip up. His
steps took a zigzag course. Once he frowned and backed up a
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The only instances in which damnum absque injuria was not
applied to underground interferences with water supplies were instances
in which the interference itself became visible. Thus, some courts
created a cause of action for interference with rights in a common pool
when the subsurface water was polluted.27 This relaxation of the
damnum approach is quite sensible because the presence of pollutants
removes the hidden character of subsurface resource pools. When an
unnatural pollutant traceable to a surface activity is found in a well,
judges face no incapacity to trace cause and effect, determine liability,
and afford a remedy by injunction.
Other courts refused to apply the damnum approach to interferences
with so-called percolating waters, as opposed to “[u]nderground currents
of water, flowing in defined channels,” though this result seems to
conflict with the spirit of Acton itself.28 This may be justified in that
so-called subsurface streams are by their nature not so hidden as to
limit judicial capacity.29 Indeed, many courts that recognize a
few steps, then shook his head and went on. Adam rode slowly
along behind, leading the other horse.
Adam kept his eyes on the stick. He saw it quiver and then jerk
a little, as though an invisible fish were tugging at a line.
Samuel’s face was taut with attention. He continued on until the
point of the wand seemed to be pulled strongly downward
against his straining arms. He made a slow circle, broke off a
piece of sagebrush, and dropped it on the ground. He moved
well outside his circle, held up his stick again, and moved inward
toward his marker. As he came near it, the point of the stick
was drawn down again. Samuel sighed and relaxed and dropped
his wand on the ground. “I can get water here,” he said. “And
not very deep. The pull was strong, plenty of water.”
“Good,” said Adam.
John Steinbeck, East of Eden 165 (Viking 2003) (1952).
27.

Swift & Co. v. Peoples Coal & Oil Co., 186 A. 629, 632 (Conn. 1936);
Beatrice, 59 N.W. at 927–28; Branch v. W. Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d
267, 274 (Utah 1982).

28.

Hanson v. McCue, 42 Cal. 303, 308 (1871); Tampa Waterworks Co. v.
Cline, 20 So. 780, 783 (Fla. 1896); Willis v. City of Perry, 60 N.W. 727,
729 (Iowa 1894); Maddocks v. Giles, 728 A.2d 150 (Me. 1999);
Bloodgood, 15 N.E. at 434; Wheatley, 25 Pa. at 531; Logan Gas Co. v.
Glasgo, 170 N.E. 874, 876 (Ohio 1930); Canada v. City of Shawnee, 64
P.2d 694, 699 (Okla. 1937); Clinchfield Coal Corp. v. Compton, 139 S.E.
308, 311 (Va. 1927).

29.

See Wheatley, 25 Pa. at 532 (“When the filtrations are gathered into
sufficient volume to have an appreciable value, and to flow in a clearly
defined channel, it is generally possible to see it, and to avoid diverting
it without serious detriment to the owner of the land through which it
flows.”); Haldeman v. Bruckhardt, 45 Pa. 514, 521 (1863) (“The defined
watercourses [discussed in Wheatley] which a man may not divert to the
hurt of an inferior proprietor, are not the hidden streams of which the
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distinction between percolating waters and water flowing in defined
channels limit this recognition to cases in which the existence and
nature of the water course is known to or determinable by the
defendant from above ground before engaging in the conduct plaintiff
complains of.
Contrary to the ferae naturae view, courts did not mention the
law of wild animals in reaching these results, which were based simply
on the court’s inability to accurately know how surface activities were
affecting the common pool. The case most often cited as the origin of
the rule of capture and the ferae naturae analogy, Westmoreland &
Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, had nothing to do with the
diversion of a common pool resource from one surface owner to
another.30 That case, although often quoted by commentators who
advance the capture theory, involved a dispute between two lessors of
the mineral rights to the same piece of land, and the court had to
determine whether the first lessor had rights that were superior to the
rights of the second lessor. The court held in favor of the first lessor,
even though the first lessor did not have possession of the gas itself.
The court’s reference to wild animals was not to justify its holding
(which was based on the notion that the surface owner had rights in
the common pool even before the resources were extracted) but to
contrast the situation when rival claimants to the same right had to
have possession (capture) before they could enforce their rights.31 The
owner of the soil through which they pass can have no knowledge until
they have been discovered by excavations made in the exercise of his
rights of property. There are known streams to which, if the lower
proprietor has any rights, they are perceptible, and require no subsurface exploration before their course can be defined.”).
30.

See, e.g., Dukeminier et al., supra note 2, at 36 (“The resources, one
early case said, ‘may be classed by themselves, if the analogy be not too
fanciful, as minerals ferae naturae. In common with animals, and unlike
other minerals, they have the power and the tendency to escape without
the volition of the owner. . . . They belong to the owner of the land, and
are part of it, so long as they are on or in it, and are subject to his
control; but when they escape, and go into other land, or come under
another’s control, the title of the former owner is gone. Possession of the
land, therefore, is not necessarily possession of the gas. If an adjoining,
or even a distant, owner, drills his own land, and taps your gas, so that
it comes into his well and under his control, it is no longer yours, but
his.’ ”) (quoting Westmoreland & Cambria Nat. Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 18
A. 724, 725 (Pa. 1889) (alteration in original)).

31.

The holding in Westmoreland is only that drilling leases are enforceable in
equity. A landowner leased a parcel “for the sole and only purpose of
drilling and operating wells” to one party and subsequently leased the
land to others who intended to drill and operate wells. 18 A. at 724. The
original lessor sought an injunction but was denied by the lower court on
the grounds that the lessor did not have possession of property sufficient
to entitle the lessor to the equitable remedy of an injunction. Thus, the
lessor would only be able to pursue a case at law for damages. Id. The
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other prominent references to wild animals in oil and gas cases, those
determining the constitutionality of oil and gas regulations, pointedly
contradict the view that courts treated subsurface resource pools as
commons property.32
Contrary to the ad coelum view, common law courts did not hold
that draining resources from underneath a neighbor’s land is privileged.
The invocation of damnum absque injuria does not privilege exploitation
but rather renders interference judicially noncognizable. In Acton and
the American cases that followed, the activities that negatively
affected subsurface resources were not limited to extraction from the
same subsurface pool.33

Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed and held that the lessor did have
sufficient possession to support equitable remedies because the lessor had
drilled a well and had the immediate ability to remove gas. The court
analogized subsurface resource pools to wild animals only for the limited
proposition that the degree of possession required to entitle the holder of
an interest in water, oil, and gas to equitable remedies was less than the
degree required if the resource were solid minerals. Id. at 725.
32.

See discussion infra Part III (showing Supreme Court recognition that
oil and gas are, unlike wild animals, not commons property for
constitutional purposes).

33.

Brown & Bros. v. Illius, 27 Conn. 84, 94 (1858) (holding pollution of
well caused by the transmission of pollutants produced in the course of
industrial manufacturing by way of subsurface currents and streams
damnum absque injuria because “plaintiffs could no more complain of
the inconvenience to them” caused thereby “than they could if the
defendant had dug a well on his own land and thereby dried up a well
on that of the plaintiffs”), overruled in part by Swift & Co. v. Peoples
Coal & Oil Co., 186 A. 629 (Conn. 1936) (finding an exception to the
holding of Brown & Bros. for pollutants transmitted by percolating
waters as opposed to subsurface currents and streams and overruling the
distinction, effectively holding subsurface transmission of pollutants by
any means is no longer damnum absque injuria.); United Fuel Gas Co.
v. Sawyers, 259 S.W.2d 466, 467 (Ky. 1953) (reversing judgment of
“damages for the contamination of a water well charged to have been
caused by a nearby gas well” because the injury is damnum absque
injuria); Upjohn v. Bd. of Health, 9 N.W. 845, 848 (Mich. 1881)
(holding corruption of subsurface water caused by burial of the dead not
actionable); Logan Gas, 170 N.E. at 876 (holding drying up of stream
caused by drilling of gas well damnum absque injuria); Rose v. SoconyVacuum Corp., 173 A. 627, 632 (R.I. 1934) (holding “contamination of
percolating waters” by the operation of neighboring refinery was
damnum absque injuria), abrogated by Splendorio v. Bilray Demolition
Co., Inc., 682 A.2d 461 (R.I. 1996); Couch v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 139
S.E. 314, 316 (Va. 1927) (holding drying up of well caused by collapse of
neighbor’s mine damnum absque injuria); Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49
(1855) (holding diminishment of percolating water following into
reservoir caused by the diversion of brook damnum absque injuria).
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Furthermore, injuries to enjoyment of surface water suffered when
a neighbor drained subsurface water have been held not damnum
absque injuria.34 Flooding neighboring land is actionable even if the
water crosses the property line below ground.35 And courts that have
gone astray and held exploitation of subsurface resource pools
privileged have reached unjustifiable results.36 The damnum absque
injuria result is predicated on the notion that if one’s activities
interfered with another’s use of a subsurface resource pool, all or
nearly all of the chain of cause and effect of the interference (that is,
the injury) is hidden from observation. This predicate is based on the
nature of the interfered-with resource not the complained-of activity.
Thus, the common law did not protect any and all exploitation of
subsurface resource pools; rather it limited recognition of causes of
actions claiming interference with subsurface resource pools hidden
from view.

34.

City of Emporia v. Soden, 25 Kan. 588, 612 (1881) (holding that a city
must compensate a mill owner for the loss of natural surface stream flow
caused by the city digging a percolation-fed well on nearby land); Strait
v. Brown, 16 Nev. 317, 321 (1881) (holding actionable the diminishment
of a creek caused by diversion of the creek’s source, a spring, even
though the creek received water “by some subterranean means”); Smith
v. City of Brooklyn, 54 N.E. 787, 788 (N.Y. 1899) (“That the diversion
and diminution of the [surface] stream were caused by arresting and
collecting the underground waters, which, percolating through the earth,
fed the stream, does not affect the question.”). But see Ellis v. Duncan,
21 Barb. 230, 235 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1855) (holding that the damage
resulting from “the interruption of the sub-surface supplies of a stream
. . . is not the subject of legal redress”); Miller v. Black Rock Springs
Imp. Co., 40 S.E. 27, 31 (Va. 1901) (holding interception and diversion
of subsurface source of neighbor’s stream damnum absque injuria).

35.

Pixley v. Clark, 35 N.Y. 520 (1866) (holding defendant liable for
flooding his neighbor’s land by damming an adjacent surface stream,
even though the flooding occurred via percolation through the soil
rather than the overflow of natural banks).

36.

See Finley v. Teeter Stone, Inc., 248 A.2d 106, 116 (Md. 1968) (holding
threats to subsidence of land caused by neighboring extraction of
subsurface water not actionable); see also discussion infra Part II.
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C.

Responses to the Migratory Nature of Subsurface Resource Pools:
Malicious Interference, Waste, and Unreasonable Exploitation

Although an action for interference with rights in subsurface
resource pools could not be maintained because the resources were
hidden, the migratory character of subsurface resource pools led common
law courts to recognize causes of action that coordinated the decision
making of those exploiting the same subsurface resource pool. The
common law courts recognized actions for (1) malicious interference,
(2) waste, and (3) unreasonable exploitation. The recognition of these
causes of actions reflect the shared nature of subsurface resource
pools. These actions coordinate the activities of surface owners that
impact the shared resource, and this judicial coordination exemplifies
the shared property paradigm. This Section summarizes the common
law recognition of these actions and their grounding in the migratory
character of subsurface resource pools. The import of these common
law rules, as well as their relationship with the Acton-type decisions
discussed in the previous section, is discussed in Part II.
The prohibitions against malicious interference, waste, and
unreasonable exploitation of subsurface resource pools require
reasonable behavior by those with a shared interest in the resource.
The first two obligations give rise to a cause of action and a remedy
whenever they are found to exist. The determination that the action
is unreasonable is built into the concept of malicious interference or
waste, and liability for waste and malicious interference is not
dependent on local circumstances.37 Unreasonable exploitation, the
third category of actionable conduct, encompasses decisions that are
actionable only if they are determined to be unreasonable under all
the circumstances of the particular subsurface resource pool. The
obligations to avoid malicious interference and waste are often
codified in statute and are applied more uniformly by states than the
prohibition on unreasonable exploitation. In many jurisdictions, there
are further variations in the treatment of water as opposed to oil and
gas.38 Waste and malicious interference are actionable in nearly every
state and for all three subsurface pooled resources—water, oil, and gas.

37.

The impossibility of reasonable waste under the common law is the
result of the technical definition of common law waste. Waste could be
defined as any instance of less than full utilization, but this is not how it
is defined under the common law. Rather, waste is dissipation without
any utilization at all. Thus, properly considered, the statutory
prohibitions on obtaining oil without capturing natural gas emanating
from the wellhead are not common law waste restrictions but are better
classified under the category of unreasonable exploitation.

38.

The most significant variation is that the sale of water outside of the
locality may constitute unreasonable exploitation even if the sale of oil
and gas outside of the locality would not be.
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Malicious Interference with Subsurface Resource Pools

Courts recognize a cause of action for malicious interference with
subsurface resource pools because the migratory character of subsurface
resources means that one surface owner can too easily impair another
surface owner’s ability to enjoy the pool.39 Malicious interference is
any action with the unjustified purpose and effect of reducing
another’s enjoyment of a subsurface resource pool.40
For example, in the course of its lengthy legal and competitive
rivalry with the Kentucky Heating Company, the Louisville Gas Co.,
through its agents, formed the Calor Oil & Gas Company and had it
acquire several gas leases in the field that supplied the Kentucky
Heating Company. As the court said, “[O]ne of their objects in getting
the leases and organizing the Calor Oil & Gas Company was to
interfere with the supply of [Kentucky Heating Company], and thus
cripple it as a rival of the Louisville Gas Company.”41 To this end, the
Calor Oil & Gas Company drilled several producing gas wells on its
leases in the field.42 As the aim was simply to exhaust the Kentucky
Heating Company’s supply of gas, the Calor Oil & Gas Company
might simply have flared the gas at the wellhead, but this strategy
was foreclosed by a Kentucky statute forbidding the waste of natural
gas.43 Accordingly, Calor Oil & Gas Company constructed a lampblack
factory that, because gas is burned to produce lampblack, provided a
defense for the burning of the gas.44 The putative lampblack factory
39.

See Chesley v. King, 74 Me. 164, 177 (1882) (holding that allegations of
“digging of a well . . . ‘for the mere, sole and malicious purpose’ of
cutting off the sources of the spring and injuring the plaintiff, and not
for the improvement of his own estate” are actionable but not borne out
by the evidence); Gagnon v. French Lick Springs Hotel Co., 72 N.E.
849, 852 (Ind. 1904) (holding spite water well and pump actionable);
Louisville Gas Co. v. Ky. Heating Co. (Louisville Gas I), 77 S.W. 368,
369–70 (Ky. 1903) (owner of the soil “cannot be allowed deliberately to
waste the supply for the purpose of injuring his neighbor. . . . Every
owner may bore for gas on his own ground, and may make a reasonable
use of it; but he may not wantonly injure or destroy the reservoir
common to him and his neighbor”).

40.

This definition distinguishes causes of action for activities that have no
other effect than to reduce the enjoyment of a subsurface resource pool
without any finding or allegation of malicious intent. In some of these
cases, the action is clearly undertaken with such a purpose, but the
court declines, for prudential reasons or otherwise, to inquire into the
motives of the actor while nevertheless finding the action unlawful.

41.

Louisville Gas I, 77 S.W. at 369.

42.

Id.

43.

Ky. Stat. §§ 3910–14 (Barbour & Carroll 1894); see Commonwealth v.
Trent, 77 S.W. 390 (Ky. 1903) (discussing the waste statute).

44.

Louisville Gas I, 77 S.W. at 369.
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was protected by a twelve-foot-high fence and armed guards who
frequently discharged firearms to “deter the neighbors from coming
about.”45 Run by a lawyer who “knew nothing of the manufacture of
lampblack,” the factory produced “300 pounds of lampblack, worth 4
cents a pound” in five months of operation while at the same time
burning 90 million cubic feet of natural gas.46
The operation achieved its intended effect of diminishing the
Kentucky Heating Company’s supply: the gas pressure in the field
was reduced from sixty pounds to thirty pounds.47 The Kentucky
Heating Company brought suit to enjoin the intentional disruption of
its exploitation of the gas field, and this litigation produced two
decisions by the Kentucky Court of Appeals.48 In the first decision the
court affirmed an injunction against the malicious interference:
[T]he common law affords an ample remedy for a wrong like
this. While natural gas is not subject to absolute ownership, the
owner of the soil must, in dealing with it, use his own property
with due regard to the rights of his neighbor. He cannot be
allowed deliberately to waste the supply for the purpose of
injuring his neighbor. . . . The gas under the ground may go
wherever it will, but the defendants cannot be allowed to draw
off the gas from under the plaintiff’s lands simply for the
purpose of injuring it, for the plaintiff’s lands are thus
clandestinely sapped, and their value impaired. These principles
have often been applied in the case of underground waters, and
we see no reason why the same rule should not apply to natural
gas. . . . The doctrine that an act which is legal in itself, and
violates no legal right, cannot be made actionable on account of
the motive which induced it, has no application, because the
acts of the defendants in wasting the gas violated the plaintiff’s
legal rights. Both the parties drew gas from the same reservoir.
It was incumbent on each to exercise his right so as not to
injure the other unnecessarily. If one wasted all of the gas from
the reservoir, there would be nothing left for the other. Every
owner may bore for gas on his own ground, and may make a
reasonable use of it; but he may not wantonly injure or destroy
the reservoir common to him and his neighbor.49
45.

Id.

46.

Id.

47.

Id.

48.

Id. at 370 (affirming injunction against the operation of the lampblack
factory); Louisville Gas Co. v. Ky. Heating Co. (Louisville Gas II), 111
S.W. 374, 375 (K.Y. 1908) (determining the proper calculation of
damages for the malicious interference). The Kentucky Court of Appeals
was the highest court in Kentucky prior to 1976.

49.

Louisville Gas I, 77 S.W. at 369–70.
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In the second decision the court considered the proper calculation of
damages for the malicious interference and once again set out the
legal obligations between surface owners:
The right of the surface owners to take gas from subjacent fields
or reservoirs is a right in common. There is no property in the
gas until it is taken. Before it is taken it is fugitive in its nature,
and belongs in common to the owners of the surface. The right
of the owners to take it is without stint; the only limitation
being that it must be taken for a lawful purpose and in a
reasonable manner. Each tenant in common is restricted to a
reasonable use of this right, and each is entitled to the natural
flow of the gas from the subjacent fields, and any unlawful
exercise of this right, by any tenant in common, which results in
injury to the natural right of any other tenant or surface owner,
is an actionable wrong.50

In this pair of decisions, the court’s recognition of an action for
malicious interference was grounded in the migratory character of
subsurface natural gas. In the first, the court noted that “gas under
the ground may go wherever it will” and if one surface owner “wasted
all of the gas from the reservoir, there would be nothing left for the
other.”51 And in the second the court noted that gas underground “is
fugitive in nature” and that surface owners exploit the “natural flow
of the gas from subjacent fields.”52 Under these circumstances, the
court held that surface owners “may not wantonly injure or destroy
the reservoir common to him and his neighbor”53 and a surface
owner’s unlawful exercise of the right to exploit gas that “results in
50.

Louisville Gas II, 111 S.W. at 376. As to the calculation of damages, the
court explained:
The damage sustained is only that which results from an
improper interference with the natural flow of the gas in the
wells and pipes of another. It is not the value of the gas at the
point of distribution, or at any point where it enters artificial
conduits, but the value in money for the diminution of the natural
flow of the gas at the wells, directly and independently of all
other causes attributable to the wrongs complained of. In other
words, the measure of damages is the difference in money, at the
point where taken, between the value of the natural flow and
that of the diminished flow, directly and independently of all
other causes, attributable to the wrong.
Id. at 376–77. The court also affirmed that punitive damages may be
awarded. Id. at 377.

51.

Louisville Gas I, 77 S.W. at 369–70.

52.

Louisville Gas II, 111 S.W. at 376.

53.

Louisville Gas I, 77 S.W. at 370.
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injury to the natural right of any other tenant or surface owner, is an
actionable wrong.”54
While true malicious interference cases are rare, many of the state
supreme courts that have not heard such cases have recognized a
cause of action for malicious interference.55
2.

Waste of Subsurface Resource Pools

Common law courts also held that, because of the migratory
nature of subsurface resource pools, one surface owner could sue
another surface owner for waste.56 Common law waste of subsurface
54.

Louisville Gas II, 111 S.W. at 376.

55.

Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guar. Oil Co., 82 So. 206, 210, 211 (La. 1919)
(observing under civil law that “[o]n the point of an owner not being
allowed through pure spite or wantonness to do something on his
property injurious to his neighbor, we find but one dissenting voice
among the French law-writers and decisions” and quoting other French
law-writers for the proposition that “[i]f it is found that an owner who
has dug his soil has been prompted in doing so simply by the desire to
injure his neighbor, the court can abate what has been done” (citation
omitted)); Finley v. Teeter Stone, Inc., 248 A.2d 106, 115 (Md. 1968)
(declining to decide whether malicious interference with subsurface
water is actionable because there was no “contention or proof . . . that
there was . . . malice”); Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439, 447 (1870)
(“[E]xcavations maliciously made in one’s own land, with a view to
destroy a spring or well in his neighbor’s land, could not be regarded as
reasonable; and there would be much ground for holding that if the
spring or well in his neighbor’s land could be preserved without material
detriment to the land owner making such excavations, it would be
evidence of malice, or such negligence as to be equivalent to malice.”);
Hague v. Wheeler, 27 A. 714, 718 (Pa. 1893) (noting plaintiffs could not
“complain of the defendants for the act of drilling the well on their land
on any other ground than the existence of malice or negligence”);
Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528, 533 (1855) (“Neither the civil law nor
the common law permits a man to be deprived of a well or spring or
stream of water for the mere gratification of malice.”); Rose v. SoconyVacuum Corp., 173 A. 627, 630 (R.I. 1934) (noting landowner can
“appropriate to its own use the percolating waters under its soil,
providing that in so doing it was not actuated by an improper motive”);
City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex.
1955) (noting common law limitation that a surface owner “may not
maliciously take water for the sole purpose of injuring his neighbor”).

56.

McCoy v. Ark. Natural Gas Co., 165 So. 632, 634 (La. 1936) (reversing
dismissal of negligent waste of gas complaint because plaintiff’s
complaint alleged the waste diminished the market value of the land);
Higgins, 82 S. at 212 (holding under civil law that the refusal to plug an
abandoned well may be an actionable nuisance); Stillwater Water Co. v.
Farmer, 93 N.W. 907, 910 (Minn. 1903) (holding the digging of a trench
that has no function other than to divert percolating waters into a city
sewer constitutes actionable waste regardless of the trench digger’s
intent); Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 563 (Tex. 1948)
(holding “the negligent waste and destruction of petitioners’ gas and
distillate was neither a legitimate drainage of the minerals from beneath
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resource pools is any unreasonable act or refusal to act that
unjustifiably exhausts the subsurface resource pool.
In Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., the Texas Supreme Court
recognized a cause of action for negligent waste of oil.57 Mabel, Frank,
and Charles Elliff owned half the surface land above a “huge reservoir
of gas and distillate,” and Clara Driscoll owned the remainder.58 The
Elliffs leased their land and had one producing well. Driscoll engaged
Texon Drilling to drill 466 feet east of the Elliff property.
Unfortunately for all concerned, the Driscoll well “blew out, caught
fire and cratered” because the Texon Drilling failed to use “drilling
mud of sufficient weight,” causing “huge quantities of gas, distillate
and some oil [to be] blown into the air, dissipating large quantities
from the reservoir.”59 Over time, the “opening in the ground . . .
gradually increased until it enveloped and destroyed” the Elliffs’ well,
which accordingly “blew out, cratered, caught fire and burned for several
years.”60 Justifiably incensed, the Elliffs sued and obtained a verdict
for “$154,518.19, which included $148,548.19 for the gas and distillate,
and $5970 for damages to the land and cattle.”61 The Court of Civil
Appeals overturned the verdict on the ground that the majority of the
lost gas and distillate first drained across the property line and then
escaped through the blown out well on Driscoll’s land.62
The Texas Supreme Court reversed. The court noted at the outset
the migratory character of oil and gas: “[T]hese minerals will migrate
across property lines towards any low pressure area created by
production from the common pool.”63 The court agreed with the lower
court that drainage of oil and gas does not generally give rise to a
cause of action.64 But “[e]ach owner whose land overlies the basin has
a like interest, and each must of necessity exercise his rights with
some regard to the rights of others.”65 Accordingly, “under the common
law, and independent of the conservation statutes,” surface owners are
their lands nor a lawful or reasonable appropriation of them” and was
therefore actionable).
57.

Elliff, 210 S.W.2d at 562.

58.

Id. at 559.

59.

Id. at 559–60.

60.

Id. at 559.

61.

Id. at 560.

62.

Texon Drilling Co. v. Elliff, 210 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947),
rev’d, 210 S.W.2d 558.

63.

Elliff, 210 S.W. at 561 (Tex. Sup. Ct.).

64.

Id. at 562 (“[T]here is no liability for reasonable and legitimate drainage
from the common pool.”).

65.

Id.
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“legally bound to use due care to avoid the negligent waste or
destruction of the minerals imbedded in [neighboring] oil and gasbearing strata.”66
Similarly, Pennsylvania recognizes a cause of action for waste of
the subsurface resource pools that results from negligence.67 In Hague
v. Wheeler, two landowners who were recovering and marketing gas
from a subsurface pool sought and received an injunction from a lower
court against a third landowner who had tapped the pool, preventing
the third landowner from releasing the gas into the air.68 The third
landowner had been unable to market the gas while the other two
were successfully doing so.69 Releasing the gas “reduce[d] ultimately
the flow of gas from” the other two landowners’ wells.70 The
landowners claimed that releasing rather than capturing the gas
unreasonably harmed them by diminishing the productivity of their
own wells without any offsetting benefit to the landowner who
released the gas into the air; he released the gas only to get leverage
over the other two landowners (the bill averred the third landowner
had threatened to release the gas unless he received payment from the
other two landowners). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the
lower court’s grant of an injunction and held that venting gas could
not constitute an actionable nuisance simply because it diminished a
common pool without benefiting the venting land owner, it did so
because it found from the circumstances of the case that the gas was
vented in “good faith” and not “with malice, or in negligence.”71
Common law waste cases are rare (albeit less rare than malicious
interference cases) in part because many states statutorily prohibit
waste of subsurface resource pools.72 Some state supreme courts that
66.

Id. at 563.

67.

See Hague v. Wheeler, 27 A. 714, 719–20 (Pa. 1893).

68.

Id. at 718.

69.

Id. at 718–19.

70.

Id. at 719.

71.

Id. at 718.

72.

The following state statutes prohibit the waste of both oil and gas
unless otherwise noted: Ala. Code § 9-17-11 (2001); Alaska Stat.
§ 31.05.095 (2012); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 27-503 (2000); Ark.
Code Ann. § 15-72-105 (2009); Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 3300, 3500
(West 2001) (gas); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 34-60-107 (2012); Fla. Stat.
§ 377.20 (2012); Ga. Code Ann. § 12-4-53 (2012); Idaho Code Ann.
§ 47-316 (2003); 225 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 725 / 1.1 (West 2007);
Iowa Code § 458A.3 (2013); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55-601 (2005) (oil);
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 353.520 (West 2011); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 30:2 (2007); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 324.61504 (West 1999);
Miss. Code Ann. § 53-3-3; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 259.060 (2000); Mont.
Code Ann. § 82-11-121 (2011); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 70-2-2 (1995); N.Y.
Envtl. Conserv. Law § 71-1305 (McKinney 1997); N.C. Gen. Stat.
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have not been faced with waste cases have indicated that they would
recognize a common law action for waste if the appropriate case came
before them.73
3.

Unreasonable Exploitation of Subsurface Resource Pools

Finally, because subsurface resource pools are migratory, common
law courts have recognized a cause of action for unreasonable
exploitation of subsurface resource pools.74 Courts have recognized
§ 113-390 (2011); N.D. Cent. Code § 38-08-03 (2004); Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 1509.20 (West 2012) (requiring “every reasonable
precaution in accordance with the most approved methods of operation
to stop and prevent waste of oil or gas”); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 52,
§§ 236, 271 (West 2011); 58 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 404 (West 1996);
Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. § 85.045 (West 2011); Utah Code Ann.
§ 40-6-3 (LexisNexis 2010); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 29 § 521 (2008); Wash.
Rev. Code § 78.52.130 (2012) (same); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 30-5-102
(2011).
73.

See, e.g., Finley v. Teeter Stone, Inc., 248 A.2d 106, 115 (Md. 1968)
(declining to decide whether waste of subsurface water is actionable
because there was “no contention or proof . . . that there was . . .
waste”); Village of Delhi v. Youmans, 50 Barb. 316, 320 (N.Y. Gen.
Term 1867) (Boardman, J.) (“No person can wantonly and maliciously
cut off on his own land the underground supply of a neighbors’ spring or
well without any purpose of usefulness to himself.”).

74.

Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766, 771 (Cal. 1903) (“The doctrine of
reasonable use . . . affords some measure of protection to property now
existing, and greater justification for the attempt to make new
developments. It limits the right of others to such amount of water as
may be necessary for some useful purpose in connection with the land
from which it is taken.”); Alphonzo E. Bell Corp. v. Bell View Oil
Syndicate, 76 P.2d 167, 174 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1938) (“The common
supply, or common right, or correlative right is expressly limited to the
right of each individual surface owner to take from the oil strata lying
beneath his properties, oil, gas, and other hyrdrocarbons intercepted by
wells sunk beneath his own property, in such a manner as not to
commit waste.”); Cason v. Fla. Power Co., 76 So. 535, 536 (Fla. 1917)
(“[E]ach landowner is restricted to a reasonable use of his property as it
affects subsurface waters passing to or from the land of another.”);
Mfrs.’ Gas & Oil Co. v. Ind. Natural Gas & Oil Co., 57 N.E. 912 (Ind.
1900) (holding suit for injunction against the use of a pump and other
artificial means to increase the flow of natural gas stated a cause of
action); Schenk v. City of Ann Arbor, 163 N.W. 109 (Mich. 1917)
(affirming damages award for reduction in water supply caused by
defendant municipality’s operation of water pump); Erickson v.
Crookston Waterworks, Power & Light Co., 111 N.W. 391, 395 (Minn.
1907) (holding actionable the defendant’s use of “artificial force in
pumping the basin of supply to a low level,” which “deprive[d] the
plaintiff of pure water provided in the natural use of his artesian well”
and thereby “indirectly compel[led] him to buy from” the defendant);
Olson v. City of Wahoo, 248 N.W. 304, 308 (Neb. 1933) (holding “the
owner of land . . . cannot extract and appropriate” subterranean waters
“in excess of a reasonable and beneficial use upon the land which he
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owns, especially if such use is injurious to others who have substantial
rights to the waters” and further that “if the natural underground
supply is insufficient for all owners, each is entitled to a reasonable
proportion of the whole”); Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569,
577 (1862) (holding “any interference by one land-owner with the
natural drainage, injurious to the land of another, and not reasonable, is
unjustifiable” and therefore actionable); Hathorn v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co., 87 N.E. 504, 507–08 (N.Y. 1909) (holding use of “pumps and
other apparatus for the purpose of accelerating and increasing the flow
of subterranean percolating waters and gas through deep wells” may
constitute “unreasonable and improper conduct” for which plaintiff has
“sufficient cause for appeal to, and relief by, a court of equity”); Forbell
v. City of New York, 58 N.E. 644 (N.Y. 1900) (holding use of wells and
pumping station to withdraw and market large quantities of water
thereby lowering the underground water is actionably unreasonable);
Rouse v. City of Kinston, 123 S.E. 482, 492 (N.C. 1924) (observing
“[w]ater is a fluid, mobile, unstable” and affirming judgment for
unreasonably withdrawing large quantities of water from deep wells and
transmitting by pipe to customers thereby drying up the wells on a
neighboring parcel); Cline v. Am. Aggregates Corp., 474 N.E.2d 324,
327 (Ohio 1984) (adopting reasonable use doctrine for “the resolution of
ground water conflicts”); Canada v. City of Shawnee, 64 P.2d 694, 696
(Okl. 1936) (holding pumping “[e]normous volumes of water . . . from
under the lands of the defendant and of plaintiffs” for transport by
pipeline to customers thereby drying up “the wells on all of plaintiffs’
lands” actionably unreasonable); Rothrauff v. Sinking Spring Water Co.,
14 A.2d 87, 90 (Pa. 1940) (holding “the diversion or sale to others away
from the land” of subsurface water that “impairs the supply of a spring
or well on the property of another . . . is not for a ‘lawful purpose’
within the general rule concerning percolating waters, but constitutes an
actionable wrong for which damages are recoverable”); Horne v. Utah
Oil Ref. Co., 202 P. 815, 817–18 (Utah 1921) (holding that pumping
large quantities of water from artisanal basin “to be conducted and
conveyed away to [defendant’s] oil refinery beyond the boundaries of
[the] artesian district, there to be used for commercial and
manufacturing purposes” is actionably unreasonable); Pence v. Carney,
52 S.E. 702, 706 (W. Va. 1905) (holding “unreasonable and
nonbeneficial use” of subsurface water actionable, but pumping and
wasting of waters that is “merely temporary, and done in good faith, for
the purpose of completing the well for legitimate use” is not
unreasonable and nonbeneficial use); State v. Michels Pipeline Constr.,
Inc., 217 N.W.2d 339, 351 (Wis. 1974) (holding the cause of
unreasonable harm through lowering the water table or reducing
artesian pressure by withdrawing subsurface water actionable). The
opinion in Katz v. Walkinshaw notes that its holding might or might not
properly be applied to oil in another case. 74 P. at 772–73. The holding
in Alphonzo E. Bell Corp. v. Bell View Oil Syndicate can also be
explained by the doctrine of trespass. 6 P.2d 167. The Maryland Court
of Appeals has expressly reserved the unreasonable exploitation
question. Finley, 248 A.2d at 113–15 (Md. 1968) (declining to decide
whether unreasonable exploitation of subsurface water is actionable
because a quarrying company’s removal of subsurface water using a
pump is not unreasonable and there was “no contention or proof . . .
that there was any . . . other unreasonable use”).
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actions for unreasonable extraction methods, complete exhaustion of
subsurface water, carrying off water from the land from which it is
drawn, and sale of water. On the other hand, there are cases that hold
or suggest unreasonable exploitation is never actionable, but we argue
these decisions and suggestions do not reflect the majority rule.75
For example, in Manufacturers’ Gas & Oil Co. v. Indiana Natural
Gas & Oil Co., suppliers and end users of natural gas withdrawn from
a large reservoir sought to enjoin the Indiana Natural Gas & Oil from
“using devices for pumping, and from employing any other artificial
process or appliance for the purpose, or having the effect of,
increasing the natural flow of gas” flowing out of the reservoir
through its many wells.76 Before this case, there was some indication
such an action would not be recognized in Indiana.77 The trial court
dismissed the action and the court of appeals affirmed.78 The Indiana
Supreme Court reversed and held unreasonable exploitation is actionable:
Natural gas is a fluid mineral substance, subterraneous in its origin
and location. . . . [T]here are reasons why the right to protect it
from entire destruction while in the ground should be exercised by
the owners of the land who are interested in the common reservoir.
75.

Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 65 A. 801 (Pa. Com. Pl.
1906) (holding location of wells near the property line not actionable),
aff’d per curiam, 65 A. 801 (Pa. 1907); Jones v. Forest Oil Co., 47 Pitt.
L.J. 58 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1899) (holding use of a gas pump which
diminished the production of adjoining landowners unless those
landowners also employed a gas pump not actionable), aff’d per curiam,
44 A. 1074 (Pa. 1900); Gain v. S. Penn Oil Co., 86 S.E. 883, 885 (W.
Va. 1915) (implying in dispute between lessor and lessee over location of
oil well that landowners may locate oil wells “near the division line”);
United Carbon Co. v. Campbellsville Gas Co., 18 S.W.2d. 1110, 1112–14
(Ky. 1929) (abrogating the Kentucky tenancy in common rule with
citations to the Summers treatise and the cases it cites, especially Jones,
by holding the use of compressor privileged without consideration of
tenancy in common ownership of the natural gas); Drinkwine v. State,
300 A.2d 616, 618 (Vt. 1973) (affirming dismissal of complaint asserting
unreasonable exploitation because “no correlative rights exist between
adjoining landowners in percolating waters”); Sipriano v. Great Spring
Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 1999) (refusing to “limit the
common-law right of a surface owner to take water from a common
reservoir by imposing liability on landowners who ‘unreasonably’ use
groundwater to their neighbors’ detriment.”).

76.

Mfrs.’ Gas & Oil, 57 N.E. at 91213.

77.

People’s Gas Co. v. Tyner, 31 N.E. 59 (Ind. 1892) (affirming grant of a
temporary injunction against the use of nitroglycerin to initiate
explosions aimed at increasing production not because it would
artificially accelerate drainage of oil, as plaintiff had contended, but
because the detonations might be hazardous to life and property).

78.

Mfrs.’ Gas & Oil, 57 N.E. at 917 (reversing judgment “with instructions
to overrule the demurrer”).
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. . . [T]his right ought to reside somewhere, and we are of the
opinion that it is held, and may be exercised, by the owners of the
land, as well as by the state. Natural gas in the ground is so far the
subject of property rights in the owners of the superincumbent
lands, that while each of them has the right to bore or mine for it
on his own land, and to use such portion of it as, when left to the
natural laws of flowage, may rise in the wells of such owner and
into his pipes, no one of the owners of such lands has the right,
without the consent of all the other owners, to induce an unnatural
flow into or through his own wells, or to do any act with reference
to the common reservoir, and the body of gas therein, injurious to,
or calculated to destroy, it. In the case of lakes or flowing streams,
it cannot be said that any particular part or quantity or proportion
of the water in them belongs to any particular land or riparian
owner; each having an equal right to take what reasonable quantity
he will for his own use. But the limitation is upon the manner of
taking. So, in the case of natural gas, the manner of taking must be
reasonable, and not injurious to or destructive of the common
source from which the gas is drawn. . . . [O]ne common owner of
the gas in the common reservoir cannot devest all the others of
their rights without wrongdoing. . . . [T]he common owners of the
gas in the common reservoir, separately or together, have the right
to enjoin any and all acts of another owner which will materially
injure, or which will involve the destruction of, the property in the
common fund, or supply of gas. . . . There is something in the
nature of unity in their possession of the gas in the reservoir. . . .
The facts stated in the complaint constitute a cause of action . . . .79

The Indiana Supreme Court’s recognition of a cause of action for
unreasonable exploitation was grounded in its observation that the
surface owners have a “unity in their possession of the gas in the
reservoir” because of the migratory nature of subsurface natural gas.80
Because the cause of action focused on the “manner of taking,” it
addressed activities that were not hidden (and that did not, for that
reason, escape judicial scrutiny), and a court could assess the
reasonableness of their impact on the shared resource.81
In Forbell v. City of New York, New York City had installed a
water pumping plant that it knew would drain a significant amount of
water from under areas outside the city.82 The New York Court of
Appeals held this unreasonable exploitation of the subsurface water
actionable:
79.

Id. at 91517.

80.

Id. at 917. The court cites Blackstone for the “unity of possession”
proposition. Id. (citing 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *182).

81.

Id. at 915.

82.

Forbell v. City of New York, 58 N.E. 644, 645 (N.Y. 1900).
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In the cases in which the lawfulness of interference with
percolating waters has been upheld, either the reasonableness of
the acts resulting in the interference, or the unreasonableness of
imposing an unnecessary restriction upon the owner’s dominion
of his own land, has been recognized. In the absence of contract
or enactment, whatever it is reasonable for the owner to do with
his subsurface water, regard being had to the definite rights of
others, he may do. He may make the most of it that he
reasonably can. It is not unreasonable, so far as it is now
apparent to us, that he should dig wells and take therefrom all
the water that he needs in order to the fullest enjoyment and
usefulness of his land as land, either for purposes of pleasure,
abode, productiveness of soil, trade, manufacture, or for
whatever else the land as land may serve. He may consume it,
but must not discharge it to the injury of others. But to fit it
up with wells and pumps of such pervasive and potential reach
that from their base the defendant can tap the water stored in
the plaintiff's land, and in all the region thereabout, and lead it
to his own land, and by merchandising it prevent its return, is,
however reasonable it may appear to the defendant and its
customers, unreasonable as to the plaintiff and the others whose
lands are thus clandestinely sapped, and their value impaired.83

The New York Court of Appeals extended the holding in Forbell to a
factually similar case in which the purpose of the pumping was to
withdraw and market natural gas with the ancillary effect of also
withdrawing and wasting unreasonably large quantities of water.84
While the common law cause of action for unreasonable
exploitation of subsurface water is widely accepted, a pair of decisions
from Pennsylvania and one from Ohio obscure the existence of the
cause of action for unreasonable exploitation of oil and gas.85 In Kelly
83.

Id. at 64546.

84.

Hathorn v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 87 N.E. 504, 507–08 (N.Y. 1909)
(holding use of “pumps and other apparatus for the purpose of
accelerating and increasing the flow of subterranean percolating waters
and gas through deep wells” may constitute “unreasonable and improper
conduct” for which plaintiff has “sufficient cause for appeal to, and relief
by, a court of equity”).

85.

Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co. 49 N.E. 399 (Ohio 1897); Jones v. Forest Oil Co.,
47 Pitt. L.J. 58 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1899) (holding use of a gas pump which
diminished the production of adjoining landowners unless those
landowners also employed a gas pump not actionable), aff’d per curiam
44 A. 1074 (Pa. 1900); Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 216
Pa. 362 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1906) (holding location of wells near the property
line not actionable), aff’d per curiam 65 A. 801 (Pa. 1907); see 1
Summers Oil and Gas § 3:2 (3d ed. 2012) (“The Pennsylvania court in
Jones[, 47 Pitt. L.J. 58,] refused to enjoin the defendant from operating
a pump which was drawing oil from the plaintiff's land. Likewise the
Pennsylvania court in Barnard[, 216 Pa. 362], and the Ohio court in
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v. Ohio, decided in 1897, the Ohio Supreme Court explicitly rejected
causes of action for unreasonable exploitation of oil:
To drill an oil well near the line of one’s land cannot interfere
with the legal rights of the owner of the adjoining lands, so long
as all operations are confined to the lands upon which the well
is drilled. Whatever gets into the well belongs to the owner of
the well, no matter where it came from. In such cases the well
and its contents belong to the owner or lessee of the land, and
no one can tell to a certainty from whence the oil, gas, or water
which enters the well came, and no legal right as to the same
can be established or enforced by an adjoining landowner. The
right to drill and produce oil on one’s own land is absolute, and
cannot be supervised or controlled by a court or an adjoining
landowner. . . . [I]t is intolerable that the owner of real
property, before making improvements on his own lands, should
be compelled to submit to what his neighbor or a court of
equity might regard as a reasonable use of his property.86

This was consistent with the Ohio Supreme Court’s unequivocal
statement in a water case, Frazier v. Brown, in 1861 that “there are
no correlative rights existing between the proprietors of adjoining
lands.”87 But the court overruled Frazier “and all its progeny” in
Cline v. American Aggregates Corp. after nearly a century.88
Accordingly, Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co. may no longer be good law in Ohio
as it is among the progeny of Frazier’s rejection of “correlative rights
existing between the proprietors of adjoining lands.”89

Kelley[, 49 N.E. 399], refused to enjoin the operation of oil wells near
boundary lines, although the complainants contended that oil was being
taken from their lands.” (footnotes omitted)).
86.

Kelly, 49 N.E. at 401.

87.

Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294, 308 (1861) (quoting Chatfield v.
Wilson, 28 Vt. 49 (1855)), overruled by Cline v. Am. Aggregates Corp.,
15 Ohio St. 3d 384, 387 (1984). The Frazier court suggested the only
possible causes of action Ohio might recognize would be for interference
with subsurface water motivated by “unmixed malice” and for
interference with underground streams in well-defined channels. Id. at
304. The Ohio Supreme Court adopted a cause of action for interference
with underground streams in well-defined channels in 1930. Logan Gas
Co. v. Glasgo, 170 N.E. 874 (Ohio 1930).

88.

Cline, 474 N.E.2d at 327 (“Finding th[e] reasonable use doctrine to be
much more equitable in the resolution of ground water conflicts, this
court overrules Frazier v. Brown . . . and all its progeny and adopts
Section 858 of the Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, as the common
law of Ohio.”).

89.

Frazier, 12 Ohio St. at 308 (quoting Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49
(1855)).
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In Jones v. Forest Oil Co. and Barnard v. Monongahela Natural
Gas Co. the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued per curiam
affirmances of court of common pleas decisions rejecting challenges to
unreasonable exploitation of oil and gas.90

90.

Jones v. Forest Oil Co., 44 A. 1074 (Pa. 1900) (affirming Jones v. Forest
Oil Co., 47 Pitt. L.J. 58 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1899)); Barnard v. Monongahela
Natural Gas Co., 65 A. 801 (Pa. 1907) (affirming Barnard v.
Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 216 Pa. 362 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1906)). These
were cases in equity so the appeals at the time were exclusively in the
jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. It is important to clear
up their procedural nature, which has been greatly misstated. In both
cases the text of the affirmed lower court decisions were set out in the
reporter before the court’s opinion. The opinions themselves are short
affirmances. In Jones: “Though this particular question is somewhat of a
novelty, the principles which control it are very familiar, and perfectly
well settled. They are well expressed in the opinion of the learned court
below, and, on the findings of fact and conclusions of law there contained,
we affirm the decree.” Jones v. Forest Oil Co., 44 A. 1074, 1076 (Pa.
1900). In Barnard: “Decree affirmed on the opinion of the court below.”
Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 65 A. 801, 803 (Pa. 1907). Yet
commentators and courts have for some reason treated the lower court
opinions as if they were issued by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, even
going so far as to quote extensively from the excerpts of the lower court
decision while citing to the Supreme Court’s per curiam affirmance. See,
e.g., W.L. Summers, Property in Oil and Gas. 29 Yale L.J. 174, 177
(1919) (“In another case where the question was of the right of the owner
of an oil well to pump oil from his well regardless of injury to his
neighbor, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania apparently realized that the
absolute ownership doctrine in the sense of giving an absolute right to
take could not be applied so they reverted to the theory that ‘possession
of the land is not necessarily possession of the oil and gas,’ and concluded
‘that the property of the owner of the lands in oil and gas is not absolute
until it is actually within his grasp and brought to the surface.’”
(erroneously quoting Jones, 44 A. 1074)); Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L.
Anderson, The Rule of Capture—An Oil and Gas Perspective, 35 Envtl.
L. 899, 911 (2005) (“In Jones v. Forest Oil Co., the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court had to determine whether the rule of capture gave the
owner the power to use a ‘gas pump’ to artificially increase production
and cause oil to drain from underneath the adjacent owner’s land. . . .
The court used a percolating water case to support the proposition that a
person may capture water, and by analogy gas, by the ‘exercise of all the
skill and invention of which man is capable.’ . . . The court used an
analogy to the offset drilling rule by concluding that, since all oil
operators can afford gas pump technology, the remedy does not lie in the
courts but in the self-help of getting one's own gas pump to counter the
alleged drainage.’” (footnote omitted) (erroneously quoting Jones, 44 A.
1074)). In Pennsylvania, per curiam orders have no precedential effect.
Further, when other courts and commentators treat these decisions as
issuing directly from a state supreme court, and not just any supreme
court, but the supreme court of the state in which Drake made his
famous discovery, they are afforded far more persuasive authority than
they deserve.
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In Jones v. Forest Oil Co., a landowner operating six oil wells
sought and initially obtained an injunction against the use of a gas
pump by Forest Oil at a well on the adjoining tract.91 When Forest
Oil began using the gas pump, production from three of the
landowner’s wells was reduced.92 After the issuance of the initial
injunction against the use of the gas pump, the production in the
three wells increased to its former levels.93 At the conclusion of a trial,
the court of common pleas found that gas pumps are typically
employed in “failing and almost exhausted territory,” that “its use by
one operator necessitates its use by others in the immediate
neighborhood if they desire to prevent the daily production of their
wells from being decreased,” and that “if pumps are placed on all
wells the production of the wells is neither increased nor
diminished.”94 As to the circumstances of the field at issue in the case,
the court of common pleas found that “gas pumps were in use” in the
field by others for more than one year before the Forest Oil installed
its gas pump and “that the production of the wells” in the field had
“largely decreased” and was at the time “almost exhausted.”95
In determining whether to issue a permanent injunction, the court
of common pleas questioned “to what extent an owner of oil wells
may use mechanical devices for bringing oil to the surface. In
operating his own wells may he use appliances which diminish the
production of his neighbor’s wells?”96 The court of common pleas
concluded that “the use of a gas pump by [Forest Oil] under the
circumstances of th[e] case [was] not an unlawful act that should be
restrained by injunction” and accordingly dismissed the bill and
dissolved the initially issued injunction.97 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court affirmed per curiam.98
Despite the ultimate outcome, the decision of the court of
common pleas suggests recognition of a cause of action for
unreasonable exploitation. Not only did the case go to trial, the court
issued a preliminary injunction against the use of the gas pump. The
circumstances of the case referred to by the court are evidently the
fact that the field depleted to a point such that it was reasonable for
all owners to employ a gas pump. The case does not hold that using a
91.

Jones v. Forest Oil Co., 47 Pitt. L.J. 58 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1899).

92.

Id. at 59.

93.

Id.

94.

Id.

95.

Id.

96.

Id.

97.

Id. at 60.

98.

Jones v. Forest Oil Co., 44 A. 1074 (Pa. 1900).
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gas pump or other methods of increasing the flow of gas in wells is
always privileged and not subject to a requirement of reasonableness.
Even if it did, as some suggest or imply,99 its precedential and
persuasive value for such a proposition is limited.
In Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., Daniel and
Elizabeth Barnard leased sixty-six acres to Monongahela Natural Gas
for oil and gas production.100 James Barnard leased an adjoining 156acre parcel to Monongahela for the same purpose. Under the terms of
the leases, each lessor would be paid royalties on gas and oil produced
only from wells on the lessor’s land. Daniel and Elizabeth Barnard
protested as Monongahela Natural Gas first drilled a paying well on
James Bernard’s land only fifty-five feet from a right angle boundary
between the parcels. In this location, the well would draw
approximately three-fourths of the gas it produced from beneath
Daniel and Elizabeth Barnard’s land while James would receive one
hundred percent of the royalties. The company next drilled a well
1,350 feet away from the first well on Daniel and Elizabeth Barnard’s
parcel that failed to produce gas. Daniel and Elizabeth Barnard sued
Monongahela Natural Gas for the unreasonable location of the first
well. After fact finding, the court of common pleas purported only “to
follow the lead of the decisions, not to qualify, explain, modify,
overrule or reverse them,” but it issued a sweeping decision:
If . . . the landowner drills on his own land at such a spot as
best subserves his purposes what is the standing of the adjoining
landowner whose oil or gas may be drained by this well? He
certainly ought not to be allowed to stop his neighbor from
developing his own farm. There is no certain way of ascertaining
how much of the oil and gas that comes out of the well was
99.

1 W. W. Thornton, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas (3d ed.
1918) § 32 (citing Jones for the proposition that the “the right to pump
[oil wells] clearly exists”); Walter L. Summers, A Treatise on the
Law of Oil and Gas § 24, at 74 (1927) (“[A]ttempts have been made
to stop operations on adjoining lands, on the theory that the pumping of
oil wells, thereby producing an unnatural flow of the oil, was violative of
complainant’s rights; but in no case has a restraint been placed upon
the pumping of oil.” (citing Jones and Higgins Oil & Fuel)); 1 Summers
Oil and Gas § 3:2 (3d ed. 2012) (citing Jones as an example of an
early case that “declared that the landowner was legally privileged to
take oil and gas even though he drained oil and gas from the lands of
his neighbor”); Kramer & Anderson, supra note 93, at 911 (“The use of
artificial means to increase production, and thereby increase drainage
from across property lines, was held to be a lawful act under the rule of
capture.”); id. at 919 n.116 (characterizing Jones as “holding that an oil
and gas operator may use any appliances known to the trade to make
well production as large as possible”).

100. Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 216 Pa. 362 (Pa. Com. Pl.
1906).
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when in situ under this farm and how much under that. What
then has been held to be the law?—it is this, as we understand
it, every landowner or his lessee may locate his wells wherever
he pleases regardless of the interests of others. He may
distribute them over the whole farm or locate them only on one
part of it. He may crowd the adjoining farms so as to enable
him to draw the oil and gas from them. What then can the
neighbor do? Nothing, only go and do likewise. He must protect
his own oil and gas. He knows it is wild and will run away if it
finds an opening and it is his business to keep it at home. This
may not be the best rule, but neither the legislature nor our
highest court has given us any better. No doubt many
thousands of dollars have been expended “in protecting lines” in
oil and gas territory that would not have been expended if some
rule had existed by which it could have been avoided.
Injunction certainly is not the remedy. If so, just how far must
the landowner be from the line of his neighbor to avoid the blow
of “this strong arm of the law”?101

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed per curiam.102
The Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co. decision by the
court of common pleas is arguably without foundation. First, the court
did not believe courts are incapable of judicial resolution of the dispute,
indeed the court seemed to plead with the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court to reverse.103 The court noted its incapacity to “ascertain[ ] how
much of the oil and gas that comes out of the well was when in situ
under this farm and how much under that,” but this was unnecessary
to the injunctive remedy sought in the case.104 And the reasonableness
of the location does not depend on the actual proportions of drained
oil and gas that enter the well, but rather it is a matter of whether
the location itself has been unreasonably chosen under the
circumstances of each case. In the case before the court, the location
was not merely close to a boundary line, it was tucked into a corner
of a parcel such that three fourths of the oil entering the well would

101. Id. at 364–65. To its credit, the common pleas court was displeased with
the law it announced, as revealed by the discussion of the court’s role as a
lower court unable to declare “what ought to be the law,” the mention of
wasted line-protecting expenditures, and the thinly veiled plea to the
legislature and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to craft a better rule. Id.
102. Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 65 A. 801, 803 (Pa. 1907).
103. Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 216 Pa. 362, 364 (Pa. Com.
Pl. 1906) (“The Supreme Court . . . may declare ‘what ought to be the
law’ to be henceforth ‘the law,’ but the lower courts have no such
authority.”); id. at 365 (“This may not be the best rule; but neither the
legislature nor our highest court has given us any better.”).
104. Id. at 365.
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presumably draw from outside the property boundary.105 The
unreasonableness was further compounded by the fact that the lessee
held oil and gas rights to both of the parcels and therefore had no
incentive to locate an offset well immediately on the other side of the
boundary. Thus Daniel and Elizabeth Barnard could not “protect
[their] own oil and gas” by “go[ing] and do[ing] likewise” as the court
admonished them to.106 The court’s concluding rhetorical question,
“just how far must the landowner be from the line of his neighbor,” is
easily answered.107 The landowner must first attempt to enter into an
agreement with the neighbor as to the location of the well. If the
neighbor refuses to agree, the landowner must choose a reasonable
location under the circumstances with the knowledge that an
unreasonable location is actionable. This is hardly an unfortunate
position for the landowner. If it were, the law of nuisance is always a
hardship on those who must each and every day ask themselves just
how little nuisance they may cause neighbors “to avoid the blow of
‘this strong arm of the law.’ ”108
There is no cause of action for unreasonable exploitation of
subsurface water in Texas, but there may be a cause of action for
unreasonable exploitation of oil and gas. The Texas Supreme Court
explicitly rejected the cause of action for unreasonable exploitation of
water in Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of America Inc. in 1999.109
As for oil and gas, the Texas Supreme Court stated in dicta in a 1935
case that
[t]he common law recognizes no well spacing regulations. At
common law the landowner can drill an unlimited number of
wells for oil and gas upon his land. . . . The adjoining landowner
cannot complain if wells are drilled near his boundary line.
Under this rule the only way the landowner can protect himself
is to drill offset wells.110

But there are no cases fitting this description in Texas, and it is
undermined by language in Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co. in 1948.111 More
105. If it were simply close to a line and not in a corner, it could be expected
to draw no more than half the oil from beyond the boundary.
106. Id. This suggests the lessee in such a circumstance should have an
obligation to drill an offset well, but the common pleas court separately
held it did not. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 1999).
110. Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 83 S.W.2d 935, 940 (Tex. 1935).
111. Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Tex. 1948) (holding
“there is no liability for reasonable and legitimate drainage from the
common pool” (emphasis added)).
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recently, the court rejected a cause of action for the unreasonable use of
horizontal slickwater fracturing in Coastal Oil & Gas v. Garza Energy
Trust. The court did not explicitly examine the reasonableness of the
use of horizontal slickwater fracturing, but it emphasized “hydraulic
fracturing is not optional; it is essential to the recovery of oil and gas in
many areas, including the Vicksburg T formation in this case.”112 The
necessity of the use of the method of exploitation is irrelevant if there is
no requirement of reasonable exploitation.
The status of unreasonable exploitation is also unclear under the
civil law system of Louisiana. The Supreme Court of Louisiana has
affirmed the right to use a pump, but in doing so observed, “All the
operators in the oil field in question, including defendant, are using
pumps; what good ground, then, could [one] have for denying [a
neighbor] the right to do that same thing?”113 Perhaps the result
would be different under the facts pled in Jones v. Forest Oil Co. The
necessity of pumping in the particular field may be central to the
case, as the court curiously stated at the outset that even though the
complaint “does not allege that the underlying oil cannot be brought
to the surface otherwise than by pumping,” this fact “is impliedly
contained in the allegation which is made that every operator in that
oil field is using a pump.”114 There would be no need for drawing this
implication if it were not relevant.
In our judgment, the door remains open for unreasonable
exploitation of oil and gas suits in Ohio, Texas, and Louisiana. The
potential for such an action in Pennsylvania is limited by Jones v.
Forest Oil Co. and Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., but as
these are per curiam affirmances with little precedential effect, the
question of the whether one surface owner can sue another surface
owner for unreasonable exploitation of oil and gas is still open.115
112. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 16 (Tex.
2008).
113. Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 82 So. 206, 211 (La. 1919).
114. Id. at 207.
115. Like Ohio, Pennsylvania recognized the unreasonable exploitation of
subsurface water action subsequent to its decision limiting actions for
unreasonable exploitation of oil and gas. Rothrauff v. Sinking Spring
Water Co., 14 A.2d 87, 90 (Pa. 1940) (holding that the “diversion or
sale to others away from the land” of subsurface water that “impairs the
supply of a spring or well on the property of another . . . is not for a
‘lawful purpose’ within the general rule concerning percolating waters,
but constitutes an actionable wrong for which damages are
recoverable”). But unlike Ohio, there was no prior precedent that
rejected an action of unreasonable exploitation of subsurface water, thus
the later decision cannot be said to undermine the earlier per curiam
affirmances. The affirmances leave some inconsistency between the
treatments of different subsurface fluids in the state, but Rothrauff
involved conduct that has only ever been found unreasonable in water
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II. Understanding the Law of
Subsurface Resource Pools Through
the Shared Property Paradigm
As we saw in Part I, because of the migratory character of
subsurface resources, the common law recognized actions for malicious
interference, waste, and unreasonable exploitation. In this Part, we
argue that these actions embody the shared property paradigm. We
have also seen that common law courts, by invoking the doctrine of
damnum absque injuria, limited the right of one surface owner to
recover from another surface owner for underground, and therefore
unseen, interferences with the resource pools underneath their
property. Although this limited the right of each surface owner to an
accounting from other surface owners, and thus differs from the
shared property paradigm applicable to surface owners—such as timber
owned by tenants in common—we argue that this deviation from the
shared property paradigm was attributed solely to the uncertainty
created by the hidden nature of the subsurface resource pools.
Accordingly, we argue that the common law’s framework for
addressing problems caused by subsurface resource pools is a coherent
application of the shared property paradigm, taking into account the
hidden nature of the resource. In other words, we argue that common
law judges based subsurface resource pool decisions on a theory of
shared property. But most scholarly discussions of these cases have
failed to grasp this. As such, the conventional views of the common
law of subsurface property rights are deficient because they focus on
either individual or common ownership features of subsurface resource
pools and fail to appreciate the actual theory that common law courts
followed—the shared property paradigm.
Our analysis rests on a theory that property is a social institution
in which ownership and use rights take various forms for different
resources. Property law addresses a basic and unavoidable social issue:
Who ought to make decisions about resources and how ought those
decisions be made? In an important sense, all resources are shared
because they are the common inheritance of humankind. But society
has found it convenient to break resources into various packages and
to assign decision-making responsibility over those packages to
different individuals. Sometimes the packages are assigned to
individuals as private property, sometimes to the public as commons
property, and sometimes to a group of individuals, as in the case of
underground oil, gas, and water, as shared property. Each of these
forms of property reflects a different paradigm about who makes
cases. Thus, it may be that in Pennsylvania there is no cause of action
for unreasonable well location or unreasonable method of extraction
even for water.
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decisions about resources and how they are made. The paradigms are
not unrelated—the commons property paradigm, the private property
paradigm, and the shared ownership paradigm are applications of a
single and unified theory of property law.116 It is a functional theory
because it posits that the function of law is to coordinate between the
interests of free and equal people in order to address conflicts between
them. Under this view, law should not be understood by the
principles or rules or concepts that we normally think of as law but
by the methods of analysis the law uses to address social problems.
Under the commons property paradigm, we assign dominion over
a resource to the public, allowing members of the public to make
individual decisions about how the resource is to be used, but
disallowing any exclusive dominion over the commons itself. Under
this paradigm, exclusion from the commons is not allowed, while
consumption or appropriation of the fruits of the commons is allowed.
The commons is not “owned” by individuals in the traditional sense,
and individuals have no right to exclude others, but the fruits of the
commons may be appropriated, and thereafter owned by, individuals.
An ocean is a commons; the fish in the ocean are commons property
until captured. A meadow can be commons property, freely available
to all until the grass in the meadow is consumed. A highway is
commons property, free to be used by all, where consumption is
determined by the rules of the road, and particularly by the
obligation to be reasonable. Assigning property to the commons works
only if society has some mechanism to insure that individual
consumption and appropriation decisions do not decrease the longterm value of the resource. Without a mechanism for coordinating the
use of the commons, individual decisions will result in overuse and
eventual depletion of the commons—the familiar “tragedy of the
commons.” In the United States, the coordinating mechanism is
sovereign authority over commons resources. Thus, commons
resources are subject to the absolute control of state governments,
and this sovereign authority over the commons is not limited by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.117
Under the private property paradigm, we assign dominion over
parts of the earth’s resources to private individuals, allow each
individual to be the decision maker, and then coordinate the
individual decisions in several ways: private agreement, private law,
public regulation, eminent domain, and, most importantly, through
the market. In this paradigm the right to exclude is crucial—as
116. That theory is elaborated in greater detail in Peter M. Gerhart,
Property Law and Social Cohesion (Cambridge Univ. Press
forthcoming 2013).
117. This is especially important in the law of subsurface resource pools, as
noted below. See infra Part II.B.4.
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Professor Merrill often reminds us because the right to exclude is
what makes private arrangements and the market work.118 Assigning
dominion to private owners works only if society has available strong
mechanisms of coordination. Without those coordinating mechanisms
we run into the tragedy of the anticommons: separate and
uncoordinated decisions resulting in underutilization and waste.
Accordingly, when we allow private owners to make decisions, we
subject them to the coordinating mechanisms of, for example,
nuisance law and eminent domain. One owner’s use decisions must,
under nuisance law, reasonably account for the use decisions of her
neighbors. If society wants to build a railroad, private decisions will
not get the job done, so we give the government the power of eminent
domain in order to coordinate decisions across individual owners.119
Private decision making subject to social coordination emphasizes
that in some larger sense all resources are shared.
Under the shared property paradigm, we assign dominion over
parts of the earth’s resources to more than one owner but require the
several owners to coordinate fairly their use of the resource as a
condition of its exploitation. In the case of subsurface resource pools,
dominion over the resource is assigned in proportion to the resource
underlying the surface boundaries (thus recognizing the ad coelom
aspect of surface ownership). But exploitation of each portion of the
118. Alienability is as important as the right to exclude for markets to exist,
but it is often assumed in discussions of property. This is an ahistorical
view, as the recognition of private property preceded the recognition of
the right to alienate. Even today for some property, such as the human
body, the law recognizes a right to exclude but not a right to alienate.
This alienability question is at the heart of scores of early oil and gas
cases and the inability to distinguish the judicial treatment of the
alienability of oil and gas exploitation rights from the nature of the
rights themselves. The alienability cases are collected in Part III, but as
the questions they address are distinct, they are not used to analyze the
nature of property paradigm that common law courts recognized in
subsurface resource pools.
119. The power of eminent domain recognizes that some public goods may be
under produced without government action. Eminent domain is but one
exercise of government power to increase production of public goods.
Government may also delegate the power to tax those who benefit from
the production of the public good. See R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in
Economics, 17 J.L. & Econ. 357, 367–72 (1974) (discussing such a plan
while arguably failing to recognize the significance of the taxation
delegation). Under another approach that was once far more frequently
utilized, government can recognize in private individuals prescriptive
rights to capture the public goods they generate. Thus, an individual
who first invests in a ferry to an undeveloped island could be permitted
to sue those who might attempt to compete with the original ferry
owner once the island is developed. See Cheren, supra note 13, at 574
n.74 (recounting an old English common law nuisance action filed by
the owner of an established ferry against an upstart).
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resource requires that the rights of each surface owner be treated
equally, given each owner’s percentage interest in the pool, and this
requires that decisions about exploiting the resource must take into
account the proportionate interests of each of the owners. In effect,
this means that sharing owners must act as single unit with respect to
the exploitation of the pool while their benefits from that exploitation
are divided into their proportionate shares.
Underground resource pools fit the paradigm of shared property—
not a paradigm of commons property or private property. Given the
highly interdependent nature of the decisions of surface owners, each
has the right to exploit the resource pool, subject to the proportional
and equal right of other surface owners to do the same. Equal rights
to exploitation mean that the rights are shared, much like tenants in
common. But unlike tenants in common, each owner does not have an
equal right to the whole of the pool but an equal right to the owner’s
proportional share in the value of the whole pool—the share lying
below the owner’s land. Not only is this shared property paradigm the
appropriate paradigm for addressing common pool resources, it is the
paradigm that, by and large, common law courts intuitionally followed,
even though theorists, having only the private and commons property
paradigms to guide them, mischaracterized what courts were doing.
A.

Conventional Views Apply Private and Commons Paradigms

The commons property and private property paradigms do not
accurately address the social problems raised by underground resource
pools, nor is either consistent with how common law courts actually
addressed problems caused by subsurface resource pools. Yet those
paradigms inform the different conventional views of the common law
of subsurface resource pools. The ferae naturae view suggests that
subsurface pooled resources are commons property, while the ad
coelum view treats subsurface pooled resources as private property.
The analytical limits of the commons and private property paradigms
are not without consequence. The few courts that strictly follow either
of these paradigms have reached highly problematic results.
1.

The Ferae Naturae View and Commons Property

The conventional ferae naturae view of the common law of
subsurface resource pools is that the resources are commons property.
Proponents of this view claim as a historical matter that courts
established the rule of capture for subsurface resource pools because
the migratory character of the resource made them analogous to wild
animals.120 But as Part I.B demonstrates, this is historically inaccurate

120. Dukeminier et al., supra note 2, at 53 (suggesting that, like wild
animals, groundwater, oil, and gas are “owned in common”); id. at 36
(“[B]ecause ownership of wild animals had long been settled in terms of
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because the nonliability for drainage is grounded in the hidden
character of subsurface resource pools, not on its migratory character.
In this Section, we carry our analysis further by demonstrating that
the ownership of subsurface resource pools is not “determined in the
same manner” as wild animals at all because subsurface resource pools
are not commons property.121
Subsurface resource pools are not commons property because the
right to exploit the pool is available only to the surface owners rather
than any member of the public. The court in Manufacturers’ Gas &
Oil Co. v. Indiana Natural Gas & Oil Co. explains:
Natural gas, being confined within limited territorial areas, and
being accessible only by means of wells or openings upon the
lands underneath which it exists, is not the subject of public
rights in the same sense or to the same extent as animals ferae
naturae and the like are said to be. Without the consent of the
owner of the land, the public cannot appropriate it, use it, or
enjoy any benefit whatever from it. This power of the owner of
the land to exclude the public from its use and enjoyment
plainly distinguishes it from all other things with which it has
been compared, in the use, enjoyment, and control of which the
public has the right to participate, and tends to impress upon it,
even when in the ground in its natural state (at least, in a
qualified degree), one of the characteristics or attributes of
private property. In the case of animals ferae naturae, fish, and
the like, this public interest is said to be represented by the
sovereign or state. So, in the case of navigable rivers and public
highways, the state, in behalf of the public, has the right to
protect them from injury, misuse, or destruction.122

If subsurface resource pools were commons property until captured
and any member of the public could tap the pools, this would create a
potential for a tragedy of the commons, and accordingly it would be
necessary for the state to exert sovereign authority over subsurface
resource pools. Fortunately, the Supreme Court recognized early on
that subsurface resource pools are not commons property for
constitutional purposes.123
The implicit nationalization of oil and gas reserves is not the only
erroneous analytical consequence that comes from applying the
commons property paradigm to subsurface resource pools. Following
the rule of capture, the courts reasoned that ownership of oil and gas
should be determined in the same manner.”).
121. Id. at 36.
122. Mfrs.’ Gas & Oil Co. v. Ind. Natural Gas & Oil Co., 57 N.E. 912, 915
(Ind. 1900).
123. See infra Part II.B.4.
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the conventional ferae naturae view of commons property leads to the
erroneous and now overruled result in Hammonds v. Central Kentucky
Natural Gas Co., which held that reinjected oil and gas returns were
commons property.124
2.

The Ad Coelum View and Private Property

As counterpoint to the ferae naturae and commons property view
of subsurface resource pools, the conventional ad coelum view suggests
that the resources are private property. Proponents of this view
believe, as a historical matter, that courts were suggesting that because
subsurface resource pools are “the absolute property of the owner of
the freehold,” a land owner “is free to withdraw” the resources “at
will” and “do with” them as the landowner “pleases regardless of the
effect upon his neighbors.”125 Such a view is historically inaccurate on
two counts. First, as we demonstrated in Part I.B, the common law
never privileged exploitation of subsurface resource pools, contrary to
a central tenant of ad coelum theory. Second, as we demonstrated in
Part I.C, even though injuries to subsurface resource pools were
generally considered to be damnum absque injuria, courts recognized
actions for malicious interference, waste, and unreasonable
exploitation. In fact, courts did not hold that subsurface resource
pools were individually and distinctly owned by surface owners.
If subsurface resource pools are the individuated private property
of the surface owners, as the ad coelum view suggests, then it must be
conceded that each individual surface owner loses ownership of water,
oil, and gas once it migrates across the property line. Otherwise, if
title were retained, one landowner could sue another for conversion of
private property by causing drainage of subsurface resources. But
even if one owner loses title once resources cross the boundary, courts
have not held that one neighbor is immune from a suit for nuisance
for causing a diminishment of the value of the landowner’s freehold.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court explains:

124. Hammonds v. Cent. Ky. Natural Gas Co., 75 S.W.2d 204, 206 (Ky.
1934) (“[I]f in fact the gas turned loose in the earth wandered into the
plaintiff’s land, the defendant is not liable to her for the value of the use
of her property, for the company ceased to be the exclusive owner of the
whole of the gas—it again became mineral ferae naturae.”), overruled by
Tex. Am. Energy Corp. v. Citizens Fid. Bank & Trust Co., 736 S.W.2d
25 (Ky. 1987); see also Dukeminier et al., supra note 2, at 37
(criticizing the result in Hammonds).
125. Restatement (Second) of Torts, ch. 41, topic 4, intro. note, at 256
(1977); see also Dukeminier et al., supra note 2, at 36–37 (noting
that reinjection of underground resources “does not ordinarily give rise
to liability for the use and occupation of parts of a reservoir underlying
the land of neighbors”).
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[If] the landowner “owns” that elusive and unstable substance,
percolating water, beneath his land, it must likewise be true that
the adjacent landowner is given the same with respect to that
which underlies his land. If one owner invades the natural
movement, placement, and percolation of such water by creating
artificial suction with powerful motor driven pumps, it is not long
until he is taking that water which was but a moment before
“owned” by his neighboring landowner. We do not say that this
is forbidden, so long as the taking is reasonable; but we do say
that it exposes the futility of attempting to justify the complete
exhaustion of a common supply of water on the ground that the
landowner who has taken it all “owned” that part thereof
underlying his land when the operations commenced. His
neighbor likewise had an ownership.126

Recognition of the surface owner’s absolute dominion over the subsurface
resource pool beneath the freehold does not resolve the question of
whether the surface owner has actionably exercised that dominion.
Absolute ownership of private property has always been limited by
the obligation of sic utero ut alienum laedas. The ad coelum view of
subsurface resource pools as individuated private property requires
not only recognition of a theory of title-loss but also a theory of
nuisance immunity as well. The private property paradigm justifies
neither modification, and it is therefore not the paradigm that the
common law applied to subsurface resource pools.
A prime example of mistaken doctrine that can be attributed to
the application of the private property paradigm of the ad coelum
view is that some states have wrongfully denied a cause of action
when one neighbor extracts subsurface water that threatens subsidence
of neighboring land. In Finley v. Teeter Stone, Inc., the Maryland
Supreme Court held that the extraction of subsurface water that
threatens to cause subsidence of neighboring land is not actionable,127
a position then adopted by the Restatement and several other cases.128

126. Canada v. City of Shawnee, 64 P.2d 694, 699 (Okla. 1936).
127. Finley v. Teeter Stone, Inc., 248 A.2d 106, 116–17 (Md. 1968).
128. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 818 (1939) (“To the extent that
a person is not liable for withdrawing subterranean waters from the land
of another, he is not liable for a subsidence of the other’s land which is
caused by the withdrawal.”); see, e.g., N.Y. Cont’l Jewell Filtration Co.
v. Jones, 37 App. D.C. 511, 512, 518 (1911) (reversing judgment for
land subsidence and cracking of house’s foundation caused by the
withdrawal of subsurface water in the course of constructing a tunnel);
Elster v. City of Springfield, 30 N.E. 274, 278–79 (Ohio 1892) (holding
that landowner cannot be prevented from legitimate use of land even if
the effect is to drain a reservoir used by an adjoining landowner);
Langbrook Props., Ltd. v. Surrey Cnty. Council, [1969] 3 All E.R. 1424
(Ch.) 1424 (Eng.) (holding that plaintiffs did not have a claim against
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This result is not dictated by Acton because Acton did not hold that
a neighbor is privileged to pump subsurface water no matter what the
injury to the neighbor; Acton dealt only with the diversion of water.
A Texas Supreme Court justice, in a dissenting opinion, aptly noted
the error:
The court has decided this cause upon the mistaken belief that
the case is governed by the ownership of ground water.
Plaintiffs assert no ownerships to the percolating waters
pumped and extracted from the ground by defendants. They
make no complaint that their own wells have been or will be
pumped dry. They seek no damages for the defendants’ sale of
the water. Plaintiffs’ action calls for no change in nor even a
review of the English rule of “absolute ownership” of ground
water, the American rule of “reasonable use” of ground water,
nor the Texas rule of “nonwasteful” use of ground water. They
claim no correlative rights in the water. The Texas law of
percolating waters is not put in issue by this suit . . . .
Plaintiffs’ complaint is that defendants are causing subsidence
of their land. They assert an absolute right to keep the surface
of their land at its natural horizon. The landowners’ right to the
subjacent support for their land is the only right in suit . . . . It
is no more logical to say that this is a case concerning the right
to ground water than it would be correct in a case in which an
adjoining landowner removed lateral support by a caterpillar to
say that the case would be governed by the law of caterpillars.
In making this decision about one’s right to subjacent support, I
would use as analogies other kinds of cases concerning support,
such as the right to lateral support.
A landowner’s right to lateral support for his land is an absolute
right. The instrument employed in causing land to slough off,
cave in or wash away is not the real subject of inquiry. The
inquiry is whether the adjoining owner actually causes the loss
of support. Whether the support is destroyed by excavation,
ditching, the flowing of water, the pumping of water, unnatural
pressure, unnatural suction, or explosives, the right to support
is the same, and it is an absolute right.129

defendants for settlement damage caused by defendant removing water
beneath plaintiff’s land).
129. Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Sw. Indus., 576 S.W.2d 21, 31 (Tex.
1978) (Pope, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). To be fair, Texas has at
least employed several exceptions to the erroneous rule. Id. at 30
(majority opinion) (adopting rule going forward that “if the landowner’s
manner of withdrawing ground water from his land is negligent, willfully
wasteful, or for the purpose of malicious injury, and such conduct is a
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Courts in other states agree that subsidence injury is not damnum
absque injuria when caused by the withdrawal of subsurface water.130
3.

Why the Old Shoes Do Not Fit

As we showed in Part I, the conventional views do not accurately
describe the legal doctrine developed by judges in the common law of
subsurface resources. We believe that these errors resulted from
attempts to explain the legal relationship between surface owners
according to familiar paradigms. Although we hesitate to point fingers
more than we already have, and are conscious that many scholars
simply repeated the conventional wisdom, the academic literature on
the relevant legal relationships is replete with inappropriate
generalizations about cases that dealt with narrow, specialized issues.
Nonetheless, it is important to point out the cases that are inapplicable
to the legal relationship of surface owners. Commentators have
inappropriately relied upon cases resolving disputes between competing
claims to development rights in the same parcel;131 cases determining
proximate cause of the subsidence of the land of others, he will be liable
for the consequences of his conduct”).
130. The dissent in Friendswood Development notes that “[r]espectable
American authority supports the rule that a landowner has the right to
the support afforded by subterranean waters.” Id. at 32 (Pope, J.,
dissenting) (citing N.Y. Cent. R. Co. v. Marinucci Bros. & Co., 149
N.E.2d 680, 682 (Mass. 1958); Gamer v. Town of Milton, 195 N.E.2d 65,
67 (Mass. 1964); Cabot v. Kingman, 44 N.E. 344, 345 (Mass. 1896);
Bjorvatn v. Pac. Mech. Constr., Inc., 464 P.2d 432, 434–35 (Wash.
1970) (en banc); Muskatell v. City of Seattle, 116 P.2d 363, 371 (Wash.
1941); Farnandis v. Great N. Ry. Co., 84 P. 18, 21–22 (Wash. 1906); 1
Am. Jur. 2d Adjoining Landowners § 80 (1962); 2 C.J.S. Adjoining
Landowners § 38 (1972); Annotation, Right of Property Owner to Repel
or Remove Flood Water from Building, 4 A.L.R. 1104 (1919)); see also
Drummond v. White Oak Fuel Co., 140 S.E. 57, 60–61 (W. Va. 1927)
(holding that diversion of subsurface waters as a result of mining on
adjacent land does not give rise to a claim if sufficient support leaves
the surface undisturbed).
131. Brown v. Spilman, 155 U.S. 665, 673 (1895); Osborn v. Ark. Territorial
Oil & Gas Co., 146 S.W. 122, 125 (Ark. 1912); Triger v. Carter Oil Co.,
23 N.E.2d 55, 56 (Ill. 1939); Watford Oil & Gas Co. v. Shipman, 84
N.E. 53, 54 (Ill. 1908); Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Fyffe, 294 S.W. 176, 178
(Ky. 1927); Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Nabors Oil & Gas Co., 88 So.
723 (La. 1920); De Moss v. Sample, 78 So. 482, 482–83 (La. 1918); Rives
v. Gulf Ref. Co. of La., 62 So. 623, 624–25 (La. 1913); Wagner v.
Mallory, 62 N.E. 584, 585 (N.Y. 1902)); Rich v. Doneghey, 177 P. 86,
89, 100 (Okla. 1918); Hamilton v. Foster, 116 A. 50, 52 (Pa. 1922);
Mandle v. Gharing, 100 A. 535, 537 (Pa. 1917); Kleppner v. Lemon, 35
A. 109, 110 (Pa. 1896); Blakley v. Marshall, 34 A. 564, 565 (Pa. 1896);
Wettengel v. Gormley, 28 A. 934, 935 (Pa. 1894); Brown v. Vandergrift,
80 Pa. 142, 142 (1875); Funk v. Haldeman, 53 Pa. 229, 249 (1866); Kier
v. Peterson, 41 Pa. 357, 360–62 (1861)); Murray v. Allard, 43 S.W. 355,
355 (Tenn. 1897); Bender v. Brooks, 127 S.W. 168, 168 (Tex. 1910);

1086

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 63· Issue 4·2013
Recognizing the Shared Ownership of Subsurface Resource Pools

whether extraction of oil and gas by trustees, life estate holders, and
general lessees amounts to waste of the estate;132 and cases determining
tax liabilities.133
Cases in which courts interpreted lease rights in disputes between
individuals who claimed development rights in the same parcels
represent the most frequently cited inapplicable decisions. Resolving
these disputes, courts took various views on the issue of title to the
resources in the ground and used the concept of title.134 But these
decisions simply do not tell us anything useful about the rights of surface
owners against each other. Cases that determined the development rights
of surface owners decided issues that are distinct from questions about
the alienability of whatever these rights are. Any discussion of issues
surrounding the sale or lease of oil and gas rights is separate from
issues about the nature of property rights with respect to neighbors.
The Texas Supreme Court observed in an early case that the
questions posed in these two classes of cases are distinct:
The general question of whether one landowner is entitled to
damages for oil or water drawn from his land by a well sunk by
Gillette v. Mitchell, 214 S.W. 619, 622 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918); Jennings
v. S. Carbon Co., 80 S.E. 368, 372 (W. Va. 1913); Hall v. S. Penn Oil
Co., 76 S.E. 124, 124–25 (W. Va. 1912); Rymer v. S. Penn Oil Co., 46
S.E. 559, 565 (W. Va. 1904).
132. Isom v. Rex Crude Oil Co., 82 P. 317, 318 (Cal. 1905); Ohio Oil Co. v.
Daughetee, 88 N.E. 818, 820 (Ill. 1909); Rupel v. Ohio Oil Co., 95 N.E.
225, 226 (Ind. 1911); Lanyon Zinc Co. v. Freeman, 75 P. 995, 997 (Kan.
1904); Gerkins v. Ky. Salt Co., 39 S.W. 444, 444 (Ky. 1897); Marshall v.
Mellon, 36 A. 201, 201 (Pa. 1897); Appeal of Stoughton, 88 Pa. 198,
201–02 (1878); Haskell v. Sutton, 44 S.E 533, 538 (W. Va. 1903); Wilson
v. Youst, 28 S.E. 781, 781 (W. Va. 1897); Williamson v. Jones, 19 S.E.
436, 436 (W. Va. 1894); Wood Cnty. Petroleum Co. v. W. Va. Transp.
Co., 28 W. Va. 210, 219 (1886).
133. Stephens Cnty. v. Mid-Kan. Oil & Gas Co., 254 S.W. 290 (Tex. 1923);
Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 176 S.W. 717 (Tex. 1915).
134. Some states do not delay title under an ownership-in-place theory of
ownership of subsurface pool resources. See, e.g., Mid-Kan. Oil & Gas,
254 S.W. at 292 (“[G]as and oil in place are minerals and realty, subject
to ownership, severance, and sale, while embedded in the sands or rocks
beneath the earth’s surface, in like manner and to the same extent as is
coal or any other solid mineral.”); Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369
S.W.3d 814, 831–32 (Tex. 2012) (determining as a matter of first
impression in a takings case that groundwater is owned in place). Other
states delay title under a no-ownership-in-place theory. See, e.g., Sun
Oil Co. v. Oswell, 62 So. 2d 783, 787 (Ala. 1953); NCNB Tex. Nat’l
Bank, N.A. v. West, 631 So. 2d 212, 223 (Ala. 1993); Triger v. Carter
Oil Co., 23 N.E.2d 55, 56 (Ill. 1939); Ohio Oil Co. v. Daughetee, 88 N.E.
818, 820 (Ill. 1909); Watford Oil & Gas Co. v. Shipman, 84 N.E. 53, 54
(Ill. 1908); State v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 809, 812 (Ind. 1898).
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an adjoining landowner on his own land is very different from the
question of whether the owner of a part of a tract of land from
which prior to his acquisition of title a third person had acquired
from the former owner the exclusive right to take oil therefrom is
entitled to his proportionate share of the oil so taken.135

The court not only noticed the distinction, it explicitly stated that the
decisions regarding the questions in the neighbor dispute cases are not
“controlling upon the question presented” in lease and sale dispute
cases.136 The doctrines and decisions that resolve the myriad of
disputes over the authority to exploit a particular parcel do not apply
to disputes between neighbors—just as the law governing disputes
over the ownership of horses do not apply to the determination of an
owner’s liability for damage caused by the owner’s horse. The cases
may share subject matter and language, but no more.
B. Subsurface Resource Pools Are Shared Property and
Surface Owners Are Tenants in Common Without Accounting Rights

Properly understood, common law decisions recognize the shared
ownership of subsurface resource pools, just as with surface resource
pools, because of the migratory character of the resources.
1.

Common Law Coordinates More Decision Making Among
Shared Owners than Decision Making Among Neighbors

There is an important and evident distinction in the role of the
common law in decisional coordination among individual owners and
among individuals whose unity of interest in a common resource both
justifies and requires greater legal oversight. The scope of common
law decisional coordination between neighboring individual owners is
less than between those who share ownership of resources.
The greater coordination between shared owners can be found both
in the regulation of property whose current ownership is divided among
135. Gillette v. Mitchell, 214 S.W. 619, 622 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918). Along
these lines, a plaintiff’s attempted attack on the validity of an oil rights
conveyance based on “[t]he doctrine that the owner of land has no
property right in the oil or gas beneath the surface until he has reduced
it to possession” was succinctly rebuffed by the Supreme Court of
Louisiana:
The doctrine . . . in no manner denies to such owner the
exclusive right to the use of the surface for the purposes of such
reduction [of oil and gas to possession], or for any other purpose
. . . but, to the contrary, concedes that right, as inherent in the
title to the land, . . . and the right may be sold, as may be any
other right, and may carry with it the right to the oil and gas
that may be found and reduced to possession.
Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs, 91 So. 207, 213 (La. 1920).
136. Gillette, 214 S.W. at 622.
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several individuals and in the regulation of property whose ownership is
divided over time, such as the relationship between a lessor and a lessee
or a life tenant and a remainderman.137 The waste action is recognized
as between co-owners and as between present and future interest
holders, but almost never recognized between neighbors.138
If the private ownership of neighboring parcels is individuated,
there is no inherent unity of interest in decision making; society
recognizes individual ownership precisely because it wants an owner’s
decisions to reflect her individual preferences. Neighbors exercise a
vast array of decisional authority without affecting one another in a
legally cognizable way. Also, neighbors make a vast number of
decisions that strongly affect other neighbors, but the decisions are
fewer and their effect is dissipated in the surrounding community.
Neighbors have common interests, but these are diffused into an illdefined class of individuals. And, as the academic literature as of late
constantly reminds us, the desires of the community are a diverse
thicket, not a one-dimensional set of either positive or negative
contributions to the local value of property.139 Thus, there is no
immediate, tangible, and limited unity of interest that both impels
and justifies judicial coordination. Rather, the effect of decision
making by individuated property owners is left to legislative and
private governance.
Moreover, when resources are individually owned, the law relies
on the market to coordinate land use decisions. An individual owner
whose land use decisions upset neighbors generally also upsets the
property’s potential buyers. As a result, the cost of that decision is
often internalized to the person who makes the decision. As long as
the cost is internalized, the market will coordinate land use decisions
by discouraging decisions the community (through the market) does
not value and rewarding decisions the community (through the
market) does value.
137. Emily Sherwin, Two- and Three-Dimensional Property Rights, 29 Ariz.
St. L.J. 1075, 1093–94 (1997) (noting that most modern property rights
are defined by the object and the conditions for its ownership but not
the incidents of ownership, leaving that final piece subject to judicial
determination). As a corollary to this indeterminate framework, courts
in the exercise of their discretion more readily consider other shared
owners’ interests than neighbors’ interest when defining the incidents of
property ownership.
138. But see, e.g., Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 217
(Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (enjoining the demolition of decedent’s house,
which she had prescribed in her will, based on the harmful effects of the
demolition on the community, including the neighbors who brought the
action).
139. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David N. Schleicher, Balancing the “Zoning
Budget,” 62 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 81, 97 (2011) (citing Kenneth J.
Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values 22–25 (2d ed. 1963)).
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Because of these factors, many activities of individual owners that
have the knowing effect of injuring a neighbor’s quiet enjoyment of
property are not actionable. Thus, the owners of the Eden Roc Hotel
had no recourse when the neighboring Fontainebleau Hotel erected a
residential tower that cast a shadow over the Eden Roc’s pool at
midafternoon.140 Nuisance law itself provides no cause of action for
interferences that are judged to be nonsignificant. By contrast, the
common law applies a higher standard of conduct for dealing with one
another when there is shared ownership. The unity of interest makes
the judicial supervision of conduct to prohibit acts solely motivated
by ill will appropriate.
The common law regulation of shared rather than individuated
ownership is more than simply a prohibition of intrinsically wrongful
conduct from a golden rule perspective. Instead, the common law
regulation of shared ownership regulates decisions that are wrongful
only because they are opposed to the unity of interest inherent in
shared ownership. The failure to improve one’s neighborhood by
purchasing a high quality mailbox may be, for the sake of
demonstration, contrary to the communal interest of individual
owners, but it would not be actionable at common law on that ground
alone because there is no additional element of wrongdoing. But a coowner who leases commonly owned property for far below market
value may create actionable waste because it is contrary to the united
interest of the common owners in deriving value from the property,
not because suboptimal leasing is in itself wrongdoing.
2.

Surface Owners Share Ownership of Subsurface Resource Pools
Because the Resources are Migratory

The common law recognition of the causes of action for malicious
interference, waste, and unreasonable exploitation coordinates decision
making among surface owners not simply as neighbors but as
individuals whose unity of interest in a commonly owned resource
justifies and requires judicial oversight.
The coordination problem inherent in subsurface resource pools
arises because the decisions of surface owners (or their licensees) are
so interdependent that it is not possible for society to rely on
140. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d
357, 358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). For Professor Gerhart’s property
casebook, Property: Our Social Institution, we sought a picture of the
shadow cast over the pool. As soon as the subject was broached with a
member of the Eden Roc staff, she immediately responded “you are
referring to the spite wall.” She also indicated that finding a picture in
the archive would be difficult, as any pictures showing the shadow over
the pool would have been destroyed. Luckily, she found one picture that
shows the shadow creeping ominously toward the pool in early afternoon.
See Peter M. Gerhart, Property: Our Social Institution 355
(2012), available at www.availableat.org.
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independent and loosely coordinated decisions, as is true for
individually owned property. Each surface owner’s decisions about
where and how to extract resources have a potentially immediate and
direct impact on the well-being of other surface owners through their
ability to extract wealth from the subsurface resource pool. Like coowners of property, each surface owner has an interest in the pool
that cannot be easily separated from the interests of other surface
owners. Accordingly, courts have recognized that—because subsurface
resource pools are migratory—decisions about the use of the resource
are interdependent, and courts have thus required that exploitation
decisions have a reasonable basis.
According to the shared property paradigm, the surface owners
own subsurface resource pools much like the ownership of tenants in
common.141 Indeed, this proposition is explicitly stated in early cases.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals in Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky
Heating Co. gives perhaps the best exposition of the nature of a
surface owner’s rights in subsurface resource pools and the judicially
enforceable obligations surface owners have among one another:
The right of the surface owners to take gas from subjacent fields
or reservoirs is a right in common. There is no property in the
gas until it is taken. Before it is taken it is fugitive in its nature,
and belongs in common to the owners of the surface. The right
of the owners to take it is without stint; the only limitation
being that it must be taken for a lawful purpose and in a
reasonable manner. Each tenant in common is restricted to a
reasonable use of this right, and each is entitled to the natural
flow of the gas from the subjacent fields, and any unlawful
exercise of this right, by any tenant in common, which results in
injury to the natural right of any other tenant or surface owner,
is an actionable wrong.142

141. Just as tenants in common have an undivided interest in the property,
sharing owners have a unity of interest in the pool because exploitation
of any part of the pool potentially affects every part of the pool. Just as
tenants in common have individual interests in the property by virtue of
their right to seek a partition, sharing owners have an individual
interest by virtue of being surface owners. For tenants in common the
individual interest is determined by the conveyance to the tenants. For
sharing owners, the individual interest is determined by the percentage
of relevant surface area each owner has.
142. Louisville Gas Co. v. Ky. Heating Co., 111 S.W. 374, 376 (Ky. 1908).
This exposition is probably so superior because Kentucky did not adopt
Acton until fifteen years later. Nourse v. Andrews, 255 S.W. 84, 86 (Ky.
1923). Typically, adoption of a nuisance exception for injuries to
subsurface resource pools preceded common law consideration of a
dispute over the reasonableness of exploitation of a subsurface resource
pools. As this Part demonstrates, recognition of shared ownership is not
inconsistent with this nuisance exception because it results only in an
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Similarly, in Manufacturers’ Gas & Oil Co. v. Indiana Natural Gas &
Oil Co., the Indiana Supreme Court refers to common ownership of a
common reservoir, not tenancy in common, but it is equally clear that
the ownership of subsurface resource pools is shared:
The final conclusion of the court is that one common owner of
the gas in the common reservoir cannot devest all the others of
their rights, without wrongdoing. The acts of 1891 and 1893 are
an express recognition by the legislature of the qualified
ownership of the common owners in the gas in the common
reservoir, and any act therein forbidden may be, according to
the circumstances, the subject of a suit at law or a proceeding in
equity by the person injured, as well as the foundation of a
public prosecution. Independently, however, of any statute, for
the reason already stated, the common owners of the gas in the
common reservoir, separately or together, have the right to
enjoin any and all acts of another owner which will materially
injure, or which will involve the destruction of, the property in
the common fund, or supply of gas.143

Other courts and commentators have found another way to
express shared ownership using the framework of correlative rights.144
The Florida Supreme Court explains:
Property owned by one party may be so situated and
conditioned with reference to the property of another as that
the rights of ownership and the uses of such properties are
interdependent or correlative. In such cases each owner should
so reasonably use his property as not to injure the property
rights of others.
The property rights relative to the passage of waters that
naturally percolate through the land of one owner to and through
elimination of accounting. Still, accounting is a right almost universally
available for tenants in common, and therefore it makes sense that the
prior foreclosure of the accounting remedy in a state would cramp the
language in subsequent opinions recognizing other rights of shared
ownership between surface owners.
143. Mfrs.’ Gas & Oil Co. v. Ind. Natural Gas & Oil Co., 57 N.E. 912, 917
(Ind. 1900).
144. See generally Wronski v. Sun Oil Co., 279 N.W.2d 564 (Mich. Ct. App.
1979); Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012);
Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex.
2008); 1 Eugene Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas
§ 4.3, at 120–22 (1987); Kramer & Anderson, supra note 93; R.O.
Kellam, A Century of Correlative Rights, 12 Baylor L. Rev. 1 (1960);
Theresa D. Poindexter, Comment, Correlative Rights Doctrine, Not the
Rule of Capture, Provides Correct Analysis for Resolving Hydraulic
Fracturing Cases, 48 Washburn L.J. 755 (2009).
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the land of another owner are correlative; and each landowner is
restricted to a reasonable use of his property as it affects
subsurface waters passing to or from the land of another.145

The correlative rights concept unnecessarily and misleadingly
duplicates the concept of shared rights. Tenants in common and
concurrent and future interest holders have the same correlative
rights as surface owners over a common pool. Using terms like
correlative rights unnecessarily diffuses the common law and makes
the law in one area appear to be different from the law in another
area, obfuscating the unity of the law. Advocates and judges who
evaluate disputes between surface owners over exploitation decisions
ought to understand that the rights are akin to rights of tenants in
common and present and future interest holders, so that they do not
unnecessarily limit the scope of their research and consideration.
3. Rights of Shared Owners of Subsurface Resource Pools Are
Limited (Not Eliminated) Because the Resources Are Hidden

Courts have recognized nearly the full panoply of causes of action
available between shared owners of property that are not generally
available between neighbors: malicious interference, waste, and
unreasonable use. The only stick in the bundle of shared ownership
rights that is generally available to tenants in common but not to
surface owners of subsurface resource pools is a cause of action that
would require one sharing owner to account to the other sharing owners
for the value of the resource that the owner displaced.146 But this is
understandable from the nature of the resource. As we have shown,
courts have generally refused to hear causes of action for interferences
with subsurface resource pools because the hidden character of the
resources limits the judicial capacity to effectively determine liability
and provide redress. The Supreme Court of Louisiana put it perfectly:
“A review of the cases . . . shows that damages were not allowed
because of the uncertain and speculative nature of the loss complained

145. Cason v. Fla. Power Co., 76 So. 535, 536 (Fla. 1917).
146. Gruger v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 135 P.2d 485, 488–89 (Okla. 1943)
(“Assuming that there might be circumstances . . . which would
authorize the district court, in the exercise of its equitable powers, to
grant relief to such owner, which question is not now before us and we
do not decide, we think it is clear that no such state of facts is stated in
the petition. We conclude that the petition does not contain a statement
of facts making it the duty of the defendant to account to it for oil and
gas alleged to have been drained from under their lots, and the
demurrer was properly sustained.”); Canada v. City of Shawnee, 64 P.2d
694, 696 (Okla. 1936) (“This does not mean that there shall be an
apportionment of subterranean percolating water between adjacent
landowners, for such a thing is often, if not always, impossible . . . .”).
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of.”147 It follows that as the technology of determining the flow of
subsurface resources improves, courts should be increasingly willing to
afford accounting rights by requiring a fair division of the value of
extractions from a subsurface resource pool.148
Has technology improved since Acton was decided in 1843?
Apparently yes. The Texas Supreme Court as early as 1935 observed:
[W]hen an oil field has been fairly tested and developed, experts
can determine approximately the amount of oil and gas in place
in a common pool, and can also equitably determine the amount
of oil and gas recoverable by the owner of each tract of land
under certain operating conditions.149

Yet accountings are still not generally afforded nearly eighty years
later, despite the fact that technology has improved even further in
the meantime.150 It appears that judicial perceptions of the capacity to
provide subsurface resource accounting have not caught up to
advancing technology, but this might be attributable in part to the
fact that the conventional views trace the lack of remedy for drainage
to the migratory, rather than the hidden, character of the subsurface
resources. Once it is understood that the hidden character of the
resources is the factor that impelled courts to refuse to order an
accounting for diversion, the way should be clear to allow sharing
owners to determine their ownership shares and for courts to enforce
reasonable allocations.

147. McCoy v. Ark. Natural Gas Co., 165 So. 632, 633 (La. 1936).
148. This does not mean that the Acton exception for a nuisance action
would be removed for interferences that occur from flowing water.
Accounting actions in oil and gas cases in a pool or shale deposit pose
fewer problems for courts because they are in a determinable space and
will at some point be exhausted. Some injuries from the use of
subsurface resources are likely to remain damnum absque injuria when
the diversions cannot be adequately measured.
149. Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 83 S.W.2d 935, 940 (Tex. 1935).
150. In Coastal Oil & Gas, an expert “testified that because of the fracing
operation on the Coastal No. 1 well, 25–35% of the gas it produced
drained from Share 13.” Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy
Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2008).
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4.

The Shared Ownership of Subsurface Resource Pools Is
Constitutionally Significant

The shared nature of subsurface resource pools is evident from the
seminal decision on the constitutionality of statutes that regulate oil
and gas for waste, Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana.151
The Court at the outset noted that
oil and gas are comingled and contained in a natural reservoir
which lies beneath an extensive area of country, and that as thus
situated the gas and oil are capable of flowing from place to
place, and are hence susceptible of being drawn off by wells from
any point, provided they penetrate into the reservoir. . . . From
this it must necessarily come to pass that the entire volume of
gas and oil is in some measure liable to be decreased by the act of
any one who, within the superficial area, bores wells from the
surface and strikes the reservoir containing the oil and gas.152

The Court recognized that surface owners do not exclusively own oil
and gas residing beneath their land because this degree of ownership
does not arise until the surface owner achieves “dominion and control
by actual possession” of the oil and gas.153 The Court then made clear
that oil and gas are not commons property, distinguishing oil and gas
from the classic case of commonly owned property, “animals ferae
naturae.” Such animals “belong to the ‘negative community;’ in other
words, are public things subject to the absolute control of the State,
which, although it allows them to be reduced to possession, may at its
will not only regulate but wholly forbid their future taking.”154 While
oil and gas share some similarity to animals ferae naturae, the Court
held they are constitutionally distinct because the “identity” between
the two “is for many reasons wanting”:
In things ferae naturae all are endowed with the power of seeking
to reduce a portion of the public property to the domain of
private ownership by reducing them to possession. In the case of
natural gas and oil no such right exists in the public. It is
vested only in the owners in fee of the surface of the earth
within the area of the gas field. 155

151. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900).
152. Id. at 201.
153. Id. at 208.
154. Id. at 208–09 (quoting Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 525 (1896),
overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979)).
155. Id. at 209. The Supreme Court subsequently missed this crucial
distinction when reviewing this portion of the case in Walls v. Midland
Carbon Co. by reporting that in the earlier case “the analogy between
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Accordingly, surface proprietors “could not be absolutely deprived of”
the right to reduce oil and gas to possession that “belongs to them.”156
Under this constitutional framework for takings, oil and gas in situ
is not private property (because there is insufficient dominion and
control by actual possession) and it is not commons property (because
the rights belong only to surface owners). All that is left is to
recognize the name of this constitutional class of property: shared
property.157 Noncompensated regulation of shared property is more
oil and gas and animals ferae naturae was declared.” Walls v. Midland
Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300, 317 (1920). As the Court made clear in Ohio
Oil Co., if there were perfect analogy between oil and gas and wild animals,
then oil and gas would be commons property subject to regulation at the
absolute discretion of the states as sovereign authority. The Court in
Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana addressed the commons property regime and
the analogy to wild animals because the Indiana Supreme Court upheld
the waste statute on the basis of this analogy in a case cited to by the
summary affirmances of both the case and the companion case below.
Ohio Oil Co. v. State, 50 N.E. 1125 (Ind. 1898) (summarily affirming
judgment with citation to State v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 809 (Ind.
1898)); Ohio Oil Co. v. State, 50 N.E. 1124 (Ind. 1898) (companion case
below summarily affirming judgment with citation to State v. Ohio Oil
Co., 49 N.E. 809 (Ind. 1898)); State v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 809, 812
(Ind. 1898) (holding waste statute constitutional by analogy to commons
property regulations of wild animals and fish).
156. Id.
157. The classification of oil and gas as shared, not common, property for
constitutional purposes also limits a state’s power to regulate interstate
transmission of oil and gas. See Kan. Natural Gas Co. v. Haskell, 172 F.
545, 564 (C.C.E.D. Okla. 1909) (“[T]he contention of defendants that
the natural gas found within the territorial limits of the state is the
common heritage of the people of the state, which may be conserved and
preserved by the state as trustee of those things in which the people
have a common interest, as flowing streams, wild animal life, etc., is
unsound and must be denied.”). The states have upheld similar waste
statutes before and after the decision in Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana.
Townsend v. State, 47 N.E. 19, 20–23 (Ind. 1897) (holding waste statute
constitutional by analogy to various commons property regulations,
namely wild animals, fish, and beach sand); People ex rel. Stevenot v.
Associated Oil Co., 294 P. 717, 723 (Cal. 1930) (in bank) (“Whatever
refinements may be suggested as to the definition of the nature of the
property right in gas and oil beneath the surface and uncaptured, we are
entirely satisfied that the waste of these natural resources may be
regulated and the unreasonable waste thereof may be prohibited in the
exercise of the police power of the state . . . .”). The California Supreme
Court commented, perhaps inaccurately, on the nature of the class of
property recognized in Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana:
The decision in that case defines the so-called correlative right
not necessarily as a right to a fixed distributive or proportional
share of the oil and gas underlying the surface, which no other
owner of soil overlying the same reservoir may take and use
beneficially, but as a coequal right to take whatever of the oil
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permissible than regulation of private property precisely because it is
shared property.158

III. Private Governance of Shared Property
The shared property paradigm suggests that decisions about the
exploitation of the subsurface pool should be made in a unified way
that takes into account the joint interests of the shared owners in the
value of the pool, while protecting the individual interests of surface
owners in the portion of pool that underlies their property. Assuming
that a single surface owner or lessee cannot acquire all the rights in
the pool, this paradigm suggests that several principles ought to
inform the legal approach to shared property. Significantly, because
the common law has developed with an intuitive sense of the rights
and responsibilities of sharing owners, no major common law decisions
need to be overruled in order to adopt those principles.
In order to establish private governance of the exploitation of their
shared property, sharing owners ought to agree on the percentage of
ownership to be held by each surface owner in advance of drilling.
Although the hidden nature of the resource once made that task
impossible, modern seismic technology has advanced to a level that
suggests that assigning shares to the sharing owners is now reasonably
feasible.159 Undoubtedly, the shares might not be determined with
scientific precision and would not be free from doubt, so sharing owners
would want to build in mechanisms for adjusting the shares as new
information about the precise location of the resource develops, but
negotiations toward an agreement in principle should be possible, and
courts are available to help resolve factual disputes.
The law should function to encourage sharing owners to establish
a governance mechanism that would allow them to make unified
decisions about whether, when, and how they exploit the resource.
and gas can be captured, so long as waste, as defined by the
statute, is not committed.
People ex rel. Stevenot, 294 P. at 722.
158. The limits of noncompensated regulation of shared resources were
explored in Bernstein v. Bush, 177 P.2d 913, 918 (Cal. 1947) (in bank)
(“[D]isapproval of the petitioners’ proposal to drill a well in accordance
with the notice of intention on file, if effective to prevent such drilling,
would amount to a deprivation of the petitioners’ right, co-equal with
the right of surrounding owners and lessees, to recover their fair share of
the oil and gas from the common source of supply, and consequently
would infringe upon the constitutional guaranties invoked.”).
159. For example, in Coastal Oil & Gas, an expert “testified that because of
the fracing operation on the Coastal No. 1 well, 25–35% of the gas it
produced drained from Share 13.” Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza
Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2008).
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The precise governance mechanism would vary with the number of
sharing owners. One model for shared governance comes from the
governance mechanisms used by common interest communities. Under
this model, sharing owners would be assigned votes in proportion to
the amount of the pool underlying their property; on the basis of
those votes, they would adopt a charter outlining the basic rights and
responsibilities of the shared ownership and establish a governing
body to make exploitation decisions. The owners would then elect
individuals to the governing body. The governing body would make
exploitation decisions on behalf of the sharing owners, subject to
judicial review that would determine whether the decisions conformed
to reasonable governing regulations, were themselves reasonable, and
followed principles of appropriate process (including, for important
decisions, the protection of minority rights).
The shared owners can choose between two governance models, a
unified exploitation model or a decentralized exploitation model. Under
the unified exploitation model, the governing body would itself exploit
the pool on behalf of the shared owners, but individual interests
would be protected by the requirement of reasonable decisions,
accounting, and judicial review. Under the decentralized exploitation
model, the individual owners would separately exploit the pool on
their own behalf according to rules and regulations established by the
governing body.160 Governing bodies under both unified and
decentralized models would establish procedures for assigning
“ownership” rights to the pool (based on the ownership of surface
property) and would adjust those rights in response to new
information generated from new technology.
We anticipate that private governance structures can be privately
established and operated (subject to judicial review), with a minimum
160. Macaulay offers an apt description of an early example of one such
regulated governance regime:
There was a Turkey Company, the members of which
contributed to a general fund, and had in return the exclusive
privilege of trafficking with the Levant: but those members
trafficked, each on his own account: they forestalled each other;
they undersold each other: one became rich; another became
bankrupt. The corporation meanwhile watched over the common
interest of all the members, furnished the crown with the means
of maintaining an embassy at Constantinople, and placed at
several important ports consuls and vice-consuls, whose business
was to keep the Pacha and the Cadi in good-humour, and to
arbitrate in disputes among Englishmen.
5 Thomas Babington Macaulay, The History of England From
the Accession of James the Second 307 (1899). The Old East India
Company was a unit governance regime, but the New East India
Company was structured according to the Turkey Company model as a
regulated governance regime. Id.
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of legislative input needed to guide how the governing bodies are
established and operated. Again, the model of the common interest
community suggests that private agreements subject to judicial review
are superior to legislative regulation because the sharing owners know
best how to make exploitation decisions and because the decisions are
subject to well-developed standards of reasonableness that lend
themselves to development and application along common law lines.
There might, however, be one area in which legislative
intervention would be important. The ability of sharing owners to
reach agreement on a governance mechanism and joint decision
making would be subject to the holdout problem. Owners might feign
reluctance to exploit the shared property in order to gain an
advantage in the negotiations. Therefore, private governance might
require a mechanism for ensuring that if a large majority of the
owners of a common pool could agree on an allocation of shares and
an appropriate governance mechanism, other owners would be forced
to accept the decisions of the majority. That mechanism would induce
holdout owners to negotiate in good faith in order to protect their
interests and have an impact on the unified decisions.

Conclusion
The law’s need to accommodate the particular and the general—
to understand the outcome in particular cases in terms of general
directions that others can follow—requires legal theory to move easily
between the pieces of a mosaic and the overall picture the pieces portray.
This requires theory that can move beyond general principles whose
content is unexplored and undefined, while simultaneously capturing
the relationship between the details in a way that binds them
together into a coherent pattern. For this reason, successful theory
depends on a framework or paradigm that captures the relevant
variables and their relationships to each other. When formed at too
diffuse a level or when focused on too many particulars, theory
provides insufficient guidance; when focused on too few particulars,
theory distorts reality.
The theory applicable to subsurface resource pools has never
presented a comfortable picture because it has continually vacillated
between theories of individual ownership and common ownership that
has left the law’s imprint smudged and confused. Attempts to bring
the law into focus by espousing theories that focus on one feature over
others—such as capture or location—or by giving up on theory and
allowing resource exploitation to be understood as a race (the “Drill,
baby, drill!” v) have given the law applicable to subsurface resource
pools a vacillating, uneven, and opaque character.
Because the widespread deployment of horizontal slickwater
fracturing has threatened traditional property interests by requiring
the driller to cross surface boundaries, in this Article we have taken a
fresh look at the cases that determine rights and responsibilities to
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subsurface resource pools. What we have found is that common law
courts have implicitly applied a theory of shared ownership to
controversies arising from the exploitation of subsurface resource
pools, one that they modified only to accommodate the difficulty of
tracing the flow of hidden resources. This finding ought to change the
way we understand the law applicable to subsurface resource pools,
for it allows us to integrate into a single theory—a theory of shared
resources—that actualizes a legal approach to the many controversies
that such resources generate.
Under the theory of shared resources, owners of surface property
over a subsurface pool have a unity of interest in the exploitation of
the pool that requires each surface owner to act as if she were part of
unified ownership, but each surface owner has an individual interest
in the portion of the pool underlying her property. This is the
paradigm that common law courts have largely applied, and it is the
theory that should govern our understanding of, and legal approach
to, horizontal slickwater fracturing. Moreover, now that seismic
technology has largely removed the hidden nature of resource pools,
courts can move to fully implement the shared resources paradigm,
for now the individual shares of the resource pool can be determined
with a fair degree of accuracy.
Significantly, the shared property theory can largely be
implemented through private agreements, rather than legislative or
regulatory commission dictates. Because surface owners have a unity
of interest and neither their number nor their idiosyncratic interests
are great, most of the issues relating to unified exploitation can be
worked out by negotiations between surface owners acting reasonably
and in good faith, and subject only to judicial review to evaluate the
reasonableness of the agreements and to address controversies that
cannot be resolved by the owners themselves.
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